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In the U.S., lower income households have a less healthy consumption basket than
higher income ones. This paper studies the drivers of such nutrition inequality. I
use longitudinal home-scanner data to estimate a demand system on food products,
and measure the contribution of prices, disposable income and preferences to nutrition
inequality. Disposable income and preferences have a predominant and quantitatively
similar role in explaining consumption basket differences across income groups. Instead,
prices have a limited effect. Further, I merge nutritional label information to assess,
through a series of counterfactual exercises, the effect of income subsidies on nutrition
quality. For example, I show that increasing the budget of a low-income household to
the average level of the higher income households (a 45% increase in food expenditures)
leads to an increase in protein consumption of approximately 5% and a decrease in sugar
consumption of approximately 10%.
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1 Introduction
In the U.S. there are sizable disparities in nutrition quality. For example, lower income
Americans (those below 185% of the Federal Poverty Level) consume on average 20% fewer
vegetables and 26% fewer whole grains per day than other Americans.1 Poor nutrition
increases the risk of cardiovascular diseases and chronic conditions and is recognized as one
of the main factors contributing to the overall health disparities across income groups.2
Recently, due to the potential relevance for health outcomes, the stark differences in food
consumption across income groups has attracted the attention of researchers. Yet, there is
still little understanding of the main drivers of nutrition inequality in the U.S., which is a
prerequisite for designing policies to combat the problem. This paper uses detailed household
level scanner data merged with proprietary nutritional data to fill this gap. I exploit the
panel dimension of household-level homescan data to separately estimate the contribution
of prices, disposable income and preferences to nutritional inequality.
Using the Nielsen Homescan Data together with the Gladson Nutritional Data,3 I first
document stylized facts on nutritional disparities by income over the last decade. Second,
I structurally decompose the contribution of prices, disposable income, and time-invariant
heterogeneity to the differences in consumption patterns. Third, I perform counterfactual
exercises to evaluate the overall effect of these components on the health quality of con-
sumers’ food baskets. Fourth, I analyze the correlation between the estimated permanent-
heterogeneity parameters and demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. I outline each
of these parts below, but first I briefly describe the data.
The Nielsen Homescan Data is a panel spanning the period 2004 to 2015 that contains
barcode-level information of quantities purchased and prices paid – alongside household char-
acteristics. In order to map consumption of food products into an objective characterization
of nutrition quality, I merge nutritional data from Gladson’s Nutrition Database and the
USDA National Nutrient Database for Standard Reference. Both of these datasets record
all the information contained in nutritional labels of thousands of products. I merge these
databases with the Nielsen Data at the barcode level. If there is no direct match, I use
the average nutritional information of products grouped by their attributes (such as brand,
1The disparities are even more stark for dark green vegetables, which tend to have more vitamins and
minerals: lower income Americans eat 38.75% fewer dark green vegetables than higher income Americans
(average intakes based on the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES). More details
in Appendix A.1.)
2For example Chetty et al. (2016) document sharp differences in life expectancy by income in the U.S.
3The Nielsen Homescan Data are made available through an academic user agreement with the Kilts
Center at Chicago Booth. The Gladson Nutritional Data was made available thanks to the Yale Program in
Applied Economics and Policy.
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organic claim, product description, etc.) This matching process covers approximately 97%
of the products from the Nielsen Homescan Data.
Using these data I document differences in food purchases for consumption at home across
different income groups. I analyze differences in consumption of healthy and unhealthy food
products – as classified by Micha et al. (2017), and show that lower income households
allocate a larger share of expenditure to unhealthy products with respect to higher income
households. For example, a larger share of expenditure is allocated to prepared, frozen
and canned foods and a lower share to fruits and vegetables as compared to higher income
households. Then, I translate the differences in food consumption into a measure of nutrition
quality by analyzing caloric intake and the composition of calories. I find sizable differences
in both dimensions: lower income households purchase, on average, 50% more calories than
the richest households. Moreover, the nutrients from which these calories are obtained differ
by income. For example, the richest households source 25% more of these calories from
protein and 10% less from fat and from sugar than the poorest Americans.
I then analyze consumption patterns by estimating a demand system for different food
categories and an outside good; in particular, the Exact Affine Stone Index (EASI) demand
system developed by Lewbel and Pendakur (2009).4 The key source of identification to
disentangle price- and income-effects from preferences – captured by time-invariant indi-
vidual effects, – is cross-sectional and longitudinal variation in prices and in the level and
composition of food expenditure.
The detailed level of the scanner data could allow me to define narrow food categories.
However, the drawback of a fine categorization would be that each individual household
would consume only a small fraction of the products leading to a censoring problem. There-
fore I consider ten food categories that are detailed enough to be meaningful in terms of
nutrition (according to Micha et al. (2017)) but sufficiently broad so that most households
report positive consumption in each category. Namely, I focus on the categories 1) Fruit and
vegetables, 2) Fresh meat and seafood, 3) Unprocessed grains, 4) Dairy, 5) Processed meat,
6) Processed carbs, 7) Sweetened beverages, 8) Frozen/Canned food, 9) Sweeteners and
desserts, 10) Butters and Oils, 11) Prepared food. To account for the remaining censoring
in the data, I use a simulated method of moments estimator. Additionally, informed by a
large literature in Industrial Organization, I address the problem of price endogeneity using
average prices of goods in nearby areas to construct instruments.5
4Specifically, I use an EASI demand system that is linear in expenditure. The EASI model allows for
complex dependence between the budget shares and expenditure. However, in the data, I find that adding
a quadratic (or higher) order polynomial in expenditure does not improve the fit of the model.
5Total food expenditure may be jointly determined with expenditure shares. Following Banks et al.
(1997), I use income to instrument for expenditure.
3
The structural estimates from the model allow me to perform a series of counterfac-
tual exercises to characterize the impact of prices, direct income effects and preferences.
In particular, I analyze the effect of equalizing the prices for all households, the effect of
equalizing the preferences for all households and the effect of increasing or decreasing the
households’ expenditure levels while keeping preferences and prices fixed. To summarize the
main results, I now describe a particular case of the latter exercise consisting of a hypothet-
ical policy that gives subsidies for food expenditure to low-income households such that it
matches the level of the highest income households (a 45% increase in food expenditures.)6
I find that equalizing the budget for food of low-income households to the level of the richest
households, a 45% increase, would make them divert their expenditure from unhealthy to
healthy products, increasing the ratio of overall quantity purchased (measured in grams) of
healthy to unhealthy products from approximately 60% to 67%, closing the gap with respect
to higher income households by approximately 40%.7 Specifically, an increase in food budget
would decrease the consumption of “prepared, frozen and canned food” and “oil, butter and
margarine” and increase consumption on the rest of the categories. Evaluating the nutri-
tional impact of this change in consumption requires me to assess how healthy are the broad
food categories I consider. I draw on the nutritional data I matched and do this using the
Healthy Eating Index (a nutrition score). I find that the change in overall quantity purchased
of healthy and unhealthy products translates into a two-point increase in the nutrient score
of low-income households, reducing the gap with high-income households by approximately
50%. The rise in the nutrient score reflects, for example, an increase in protein consumption
of approximately 5% and a decrease in sugar consumption of approximately 10%.
The other two experiments I consider consist on equalizing preferences and equalizing
prices across households. Setting preferences of all households to be the average of the highest
income households yields quantitatively similar effects on the nutrition score of low-income
households than increasing their food budget. In contrast, a hypothetical environment in
which all households face the prices of the highest income households has limited effects in
the nutrient score. This is because low-income households face relatively lower prices for
some of the healthy categories. These series of results suggest that policies that increase
the food budget of low-income families can have a positive effect on nutrition quality.8 At
the same time, even in extreme policy cases in which the entire gap in disposable income is
6Notice that this exercise is feasible, in contrast with previous literature, because the framework I use
allows me to analyze the pure income effect, separately from preferences.
7This comparison of quantities includes dairy as a healthy category as the USDA’s guidelines suggest.
8Recent literature suggests that the marginal propensity to consume food out of food stamps (the Supple-
mental Nutrition Assistance Program) is higher than the propensity to consume food out of cash (Hastings
and Shapiro (2017), Bruich (2014).)
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closed differences in consumption remain due to differences in preferences.
In the last part of the paper I make an effort to uncover the nature of these preferences by
analyzing their association with socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. Preferences
for healthy products could be innately different for different income groups, or shaped by
long-term exposure to characteristics that are linked to own-income or to the income level
of the households’ environment. I find that irrespective of the income level of their zipcode,
their race and the hours of employment of the heads of the household, households with
higher income have higher preferences for healthful products, suggesting that own-income
plays a larger role than the environment of the household. Moreover, conditional on income,
households with more educated heads of the household tend to have higher preferences for
healthful foods.
1.1 Related Literature
Lower-income neighborhoods have lower availability of healthful groceries. This has led some
researchers and policymakers to hypothesize that food deserts – that is, low-income areas
without supermarkets and, hence, with fewer healthy products or more expensive ones, – are
a leading cause of less healthful food consumption among lower-income households. However,
Cummins, Flint and Matthews (2014), Dubowitz et al. (2015), Kozlova (2016), Allcott et al.
(2018) consistently find that differences in local supply of low-income households have a
limited effect on healthful consumption. This paper disentangles the portion of nutrition
inequality that is unexplained by prices – the channel capturing differences in access in my
setting,– into the income effect and what I refer to as the preference effect – which can be
thought of as longer-term factors that affect consumption such as dietary habits.
Handbury et al. (2015) find that the causal effect of access on healthful consumption
is limited. Dubowitz et al. (2015) and Cummins et al. (2014) show that the entry of a
supermarket in a food desert had little impact on the consumption choices of the households
in neighboring areas in the months following the opening. In concurrent work, Allcott et al.
(2018) find that households are willing to travel to buy their groceries. Thus, when a new
supermarket enters nearby, it may benefit households by reducing travel costs, but it does
not meaningfully change their choice sets or the healthfulness of their purchases.
The literature investigating factors other than food access in explaining nutrition dispar-
ities is still sparse. Allcott et al. (2018) further embed the demand framework of Dubois,
Griffith and Nevo (2014) in an equilibrium model of demand and supply and find that 91%
of the nutrition-income gradient is driven by differences in demand across products, while
only 9% can be attributed to differences in supply.
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In contrast, I exploit the panel dimension of the data to disentangle the unexplained por-
tion by prices into income effects and preference effects. The distinction between these two
factors is relevant to develop policies aimed at equalizing nutrition quality: policies affecting
the food budget of households (for example cash transfers for low income households) are
likely to affect consumption through income effects. Instead, programs aimed at improving
the awareness of nutrition or improving schools’ lunches, could affect consumption by chang-
ing preferences. Moreover, failing to disentangle between pure income effects and preferences
would lead to overestimating how much lower-income households prefer unhealthy products
with respect to the healthy ones.
In the next section I describe the data sources I use. Section 3 provides evidence on
nutritional in equality. In Section 4 I describe the model. Section 5 describes the estimation
strategy. Estimation results and results from counterfactual exercises are reported in section
Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Data Sources
I base my analysis primarily on the Nielsen Homescan Consumer Panel Data made avail-
able through the Kilts Center at The University of Chicago Booth School of Business. This
database is particularly well suited to analyze consumption behavior as it provides detailed
purchase information (including actual prices paid and quantities bought), alongside house-
hold characteristics over the period 2004-2015.
The data is collected by a panel of households using “at-home” scanners to record all
food purchases brought into the home (from department stores, grocery stores, drug stores,
convenience stores and other similar retail outlets.) Participants scan each barcode and
record quantity of items purchased and the store of purchase. Prices are obtained either
directly from the store, if the retailer is part of Nielsen’s store level data, or from the
information the participant records. Thus, for each item purchased I know exactly what was
bought (as denoted by the barcode or UPC), the quantity purchased, the price paid, and
exactly when it was bought. The identity of the stores is not disclosed, but a 3-digit zipcode
of the store, and the store chain are reported.9
Each participating household collects information on all products with a barcode. Items
9The time required to report this information raises questions about its accuracy. Einav et al. (2008)
analyzed the credibility of this data and they find that, although there is non-classical measurement error in
both quantities and prices, the fraction of recording errors is in line with other datasets. In particular, when
comparing the Homescan data to the Nielsen Store Scanner data, they find similar recording errors to those
found in earnings and employment-status from the PSID, the CEX or the CPS, for which cross-validation
studies have been conducted.
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without barcodes, often called “random weighted” items, are not recorded by all households.
These items include fruit, vegetables, meat, and deli items. Each year there are roughly
61,000 participating households out of which a subsample of roughly 15,000 record random-
weight purchases. Nielsen monitors the recording and drops households it considers are
unreliable. The reliable panel, or “static” panel, has roughly 40,000 households in total, of
which 8,000 a year report random-weighted purchases.
The sample I use for estimation consists of the static panel of households who record
random weighted purchases. The reason for this choice is that fresh produce and fresh meat
and seafood are food categories of particular interest for this project. The larger variety
of products recorded comes at the cost of a smaller sample size that cannot reliably be
disaggregated at the the market level as the standard Homescan sample.
Information on household demographics is collected through an annual questionnaire in
which households report education, occupation and hours worked of the head, a household
income range, and age and gender of all the members of the household. They also report
their (five digit) zipcode, broadly defined occupations,10 and four categories of approximate
hours per week that each head is employed.11 Further details about the Nielsen Data can be
found in Appendix A.2.
The shortcoming of this data is that household characteristics are far from being thor-
oughly reported. In particular, nominal household incomes are reported only across discrete
income ranges and those income bins are measured with a two-year lag relative to the ob-
served shopping transactions in the dataset.12
The Nielsen data do not have nutritional information; I imputed this information from
the data collected by Gladson. The Gladson data record information on essentially every-
thing that is on the package of a product, including the nutritional label – which typically
contains total calories, contents of saturated-, polyunsaturated- and monounsaturated-fat,
total carbohydrates, sugar, fiber, vitamins, cholesterol, sodium, among many other nutrients,
as well as dimensions and weight of several thousands of barcoded items. I got access to
90,000 of these items made available through the Yale Program in Applied Economics and
Policy. Additionally, I drew on a similar dataset, the USDA National Nutrient Database
10There are twelve groups of occupations, one of them is non-employment (which includes housewife,
retired, unable to work and unemployed), the rest are listed in Appendix A.11.4.
11The categories of approximate hours per week are “under 30 hours,” “30-34 hours,” “over 35 hours,” and
“not employed for pay.” The standard number of hours for full-time employment is typically over 35 hours
a week. Thus I reclassify the employment time categories into “under 34 hours,” “over 35 hours” and “not
employed for pay.”
12In my estimation, I used both reported nominal incomes two years ahead to the year of the survey and
contemporaneous reported nominal incomes. The results I get are very similar, so I follow Dubois et al.
(2014), Handbury et al. (2015) and Jaravel (2016) and use contemporaneously reported income.
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for Standard Reference, made available through the USDA. Unfortunately, this sample only
covers a fraction of the products registered by the respondents of the Nielsen Homescan
Data.
The linkage is further complicated by the fact that the nutrients in the Gladson Data
are measured as a function of serving size. This serving size is, in many cases, measured in
unconventional units (such as “one 4-inch diameter cooked pancake”), which combined with
the large fraction of products that have vague number of servings per container (“varies”
being the most common one) makes assessment of the matched barcodes’ nutritional contents
futile.
To project the nutrients available to cover a larger share of the sample, I made use
the products’ brand and attributes – including the description of the product (for example
“canned tomato, whole”) and characteristics such as organic claim, salt content and the “com-
mon consumer name description” and “variety description” (when available) in the Nielsen
Homescan Data – to group the barcodes into detailed product categories that I could match
with the Gladson nutritional data (based on the brand, organic claim, sodium content, and
product description).13 Details about the matching process are reported in Appendix A.2.
Finally, I use the American Community Survey (ACS) to calculate the average household
income level of the Nielsen respondents at the zipcode and county level.
In the remainder of this paper, I use the terms “consumption” and “purchases” inter-
changeably as the Nielsen Homescan Data records purchases, which I will assume, as it is
standard in the literature that uses these data,14 equals consumption. In reality, some food
may be thrown away without being consumed, or may be consumed by someone who is not
a member of the household.
3 Heterogeneity in food and nutrient spending
To motivate the remainder of the paper, I now document consumption disparities across
different socioeconomic groups in the U.S.
I define nutrition quality as the level of healthfulness of a diet. To measure this level,
I follow the dietary guidelines used to construct the Healthy Eating Index (HEI)15 and the
findings of Micha et al. (2017) to classify broad groups of food products into healthy and
13The procedure I use to project the nutrients is similar to that followed by Dubois et al. (2014).
14See, for example, Dubois et al. (2014) and Handbury et al. (2015).
15Developed by the Department of Agriculture’s Center for Nutrition Policy and Promotion (CNPP),
in cooperation with Department of Agriculture’s (USDA’s) Food and Consumer Service and Agricultural
Research Service.
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unhealthy categories and to map the consumption of certain nutrients into a health score.16
Micha et al. (2017) found the consumption of 1) Fruit and vegetables, 2) Fresh meat and
seafood, 3) Unprocessed grains, to be negatively correlated with heart disease, stroke and
type 2 diabetes. Instead, they found consumption of 5) Processed meat, 6) Processed carbs,
7) Sweetened beverages, 8) Frozen/Canned food, 9) Sweeteners and desserts, 10) Butters
and Oils, 11) Prepared food to be positively correlated with these conditions.
I use their findings and classify the first three categories as healthy and add 4) Dairy
as a healthy food category since the USDA classifies its consumption as healthy. I classify
5) Processed meat, 6) Processed carbs, 7) Sweetened beverages, 8) Frozen/Canned food, 9)
Sweeteners and desserts, 10) Butters and Oils and 11) Prepared food as unhealthy.
3.1 Share of health-expenditure in the cross-section
A simple comparison of the expenditure shares on the healthy categories across income
groups suggests differences in consumption across income groups.17
Figure 1: Average share of expenditures allocated to
healthful products.
This comparison – showing an approximate 20% gap in expenditure in the healthy cat-
egory between the top and the bottom income groups,– however, disguises many nuances
16This also guides the set of food products over which preferences are defined. Preferences are assumed
to be separable on the seleted set of products from all other goods.
17More precisely, I compute the total expenditure on the healthy with respect to the unhealthy categories,
and look at the share spent on each of these with respect to the total spent in these two categories as a
measure of the level.
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in actual food purchases. One of the many, is the prices that different income groups face:
lower income households face relatively lower prices for healthy products with respect to
unhealthy ones than higher income households. I analyze the relative prices for healthy
products across income groups and across counties of different income levels in Appendix
A.3.1. Additionally, I use quantities rather than expenditure in Section 3.3 below to show
nutritional disparities across income groups.
3.2 Share of health-expenditures over time
Figure 2 plots the share of expenditure on healthy products with respect to the total spent
on healthy and unhealthy by income, where each curve plots a different 2-year period. Each
income group spends a different proportion on the healthy category, and although, households
seem to have increased their share of expenditure on healthy goods over time in the studied
period, the gap in consumption between the top and bottom income groups has remained
almost constant. To capture this time trend, moving to the empirical specification I include
time-fixed effects.
Figure 2: Average share of expenditures allocated to healthful products.
Next, I use nutritional information from Gladson Data to look in more detail at these
disparities. I look at the total calories purchased per adult equivalent per day18 and the
share of calories obtained from saturated fats and sugars together with the intake of sodium
(in milligrams per adult equivalent per day).19
18Based on the detailed adult equivalent scales by gender and age group reported by Claro et al. (2010).
19The reader must keep in mind that the data considered contains only food purchased for home consump-
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3.3 Caloric intake
Figure 3 plots the average amount of calories purchased adjusted by the number of adult
equivalents in the household per day.
Figure 3: Average calorie consumption per adult equivalent per day.
Note that these are calories from at home consumption (there are no recorded food
purchases in restaurants of any type). Actual caloric intake differs from what I see in the
Nielsen Data. However, using a nationally representative survey that collects information
about foods purchased or otherwise acquired for consumption at home and away from home,
including foods acquired through food and nutrition assistance programs (FoodAPS), Hand-
bury et al. (2015) find similar disparities across socioeconomic groups using data that incor-
porates food consumption outside of the home.
One would expect that households whose head spends more time outside of the household
purchase more food for consumption outside of the household. However, if the patterns found
by Handbury et al. (2015) using FoodAPS holds in the Nielsen Data, it should be the case
that the decreasing pattern of calories with income is preserved. I verify this in Figure 4.20
Optimal calorie intake depends on physical activity. Therefore, I turn to analyze the
composition of the calories consumed.
tion. Hence, although the mean calorie consumption per adult equivalent per day roughly coincides with the
one found using dietary diaries from the NHANES (2,674 kcals per day), the actual calorie consumption is
likely to be different from the one found using my data.
20The Nielsen Homescan Data allows for two household heads. In Figure 4, the left panel uses all
observations of households in which there is only a male head, or the female head is not employed for pay.
The right panel plots average calories per adult equivalent per day when there in only a female head or the
male head is not employed for pay.
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Figure 4: Average calorie consumption per adult equivalent per day.
The caloric content of food comprises energy in the form of the three macronutrients
carbohydrates, protein and fat; total calories is a weighted sum of grams of these macronu-
trients.21 Lower income households source more of their calories from fat and less of them
from proteins; Figure 26 plots the average proportion of macronutrients consumed with
respect to the highest income group.
Table 1: Composition of Calories
Household Income
≤ $20k ≥ $80k
Calories consumed (per adult equiv/day) 3600 2000
% Calories from protein 0.112 0.118
% Calories from carbs 0.551 0.542
% Calories from sugar 0.135 0.119
% Calories from fat 0.337 0.339
% Calories Saturated fat 0.148 0.144
To summarize the differences in consumption patterns, I make use of the Healthy Eating
Index: a score based on the consumption of certain products and nutrients – namely fruits
and vegetables,22 whole grains, dairy, proteins, fatty acids, refined grains, sodium and empty
21Approximate weights are 3.75 calories for each gram of carbohydrates, 4 calories for each gram of
proteins, and 9 calories for each gram of fats.
22The measure used by the USDA includes fruit juice and frozen and canned vegetables as part of the
“fruits and vegetables” category.
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calories.23
Figure 5 plots the average scores by income group and confirms that the disparities
we see in the expenditure shares allocated to healthful products translate into nutritional
disparities as measured by the HEI. Each of the components of this index is plotted in
Appendix A.4.2. The average consumption (in grams per 1000 kcal.) of “healthy” dietary
components (that is, that are assigned more points for higher consumption) are increasing
with income. Symmetrically, average consumption (in grams per 1000 kcal.) of “unhealthy”
dietary components are mostly decreasing in income – except for consumption of processed
carbohydrates.
Figure 5: Average Healthy Eating Index by income
group.
Thus far, I confirmed that low income households have, on average, a less healthful diet
than higher income households using Nielsen Homescan Data.24
These differences in nutrient consumption could be driven by relative price differences (if
lower income households face relatively lower prices for unhealthy products, they may choose
less healthy goods to save money); by differences in grocery expenditures (that is, differences
in the budget available to spend on food products); or by differences in preferences (where
23The National Institute of Health measures this component based on the proportion of calories from added
sugars and saturated fats. I approximate the proportion of calories from added sugar as the proportion of
calories from sugar. I report the components used in Appendix A.4.2.
24I used the random weighted subsample of the Nielsen Homescan Data to have more reliable information
regarding purchases of fresh produce and meat. Note that the quantities reported in Table 1 are not directly
comparable to those reported in Section A.1 of the Appendix as the income groups differ.
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differences in preferences encompass any time-invariant component that affects demand).25,26
To disentangle the role of each of these variables on diet quality, I estimate a demand model
for 11 food categories and an outside good based on my first definition of diet quality.
4 The Model
I use a demand model to disentangle the contribution of prices, income and time-invariant
idiosyncratic characteristics to explain food consumption choices. To simplify the analysis, I
assume that consumers divide total expenditure, E, between expenditure on food products,
xfood, and expenditure on the rest of the goods, xother; xfood + xother = E. Then, in a second
stage, the expenditure of each of these broad sets of goods is allocated to the commodities
within each set. I model the second stage allocation decision within the food category, thus I
denote xfood as x. In this stage, the allocation decision is a function of only total expenditure
on food products, xfood, and prices of products in that group. This two-stage budgeting
process is equivalent to the original (one-stage) consumer problem under weak separability
of preferences. That is, I assume that the utility from consumption of the different goods
can be written as f (vfood(q1, . . . , qJ), vother(q0)), where f is some increasing function and
vfood and vother are sub-utilities associated with food products q1, . . . , qJ and the rest of the
commodities, q0, respectively. This approach is based on the fact that weak separability of a
subset of goods from all other goods in the consumer’s preference relation is necessary and
sufficient for the existence of the conditional demand equations Gorman (1996).
I now explain the demand system adopted in this application. Further details about the
model can be found in Appendix A.6.
The main idea of the EASI model developed by Lewbel and Pendakur (2009) is to specify
a cost (expenditure) function, c(P, vfood, vother), that is equal to (an affine transformation
of) the log-Stone Index deflated expenditures27 for some cardinalization of the subutility
function, f (vfood(q1, . . . , qJ), vother(q0)), where P = (P0, . . . , PJ) denotes the vector of prices
of the J food products. This approach avoids the need of recovering the indirect utility
function while leaving the functional form of the Hicksian demands completely unrestricted.28
25Differences in preferences will capture, for example, differences in the leisure time available to prepare
foods, differences in the relative prices of healthy versus of unhealthy food products, unawareness of the
healthfulness of the food products they consume; time costs required to change their food basket; differences
in discount rates on their future well-being, etc.
26I abstract from the effects of access on demand as Handbury et al. (2015), Cummins et al. (2014),
Dubowitz et al. (2015), Kozlova (2016) and Allcott et al. (2017) have found limited effects.
27The log-Stone Index deflated expenditures are log(x) −∑Jj=0 wj log(Pj), where log(x) denotes total
expenditures on goods, wj the budget share allocated to product j, and log(Pj) its corresponding log price.
28At the cost of having the Marshallian demands implicitly defined through the cardinalization of utility.
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Preferences over food products are non-homothetic because they depend on expenditures,
which vary systematically by income.29
Let w = (w0, . . . , wJ) denote the vector of expenditure shares allocated to each of the
food products and the outside good; wj =
Pjqj
x
. Let y denote log Stone Index deflated
expenditures log(x)−∑Jj=0 wj log(Pj).
Although the model allows for complex dependence between the budget shares and ex-
penditure, in the data I find that adding a quadratic (or higher) order polynomial does not
improve the fit of the model.30 Thus, I consider estimating equations in which expenditure
enters linearly and I add time fixed-effects to account for the time trend. I obtain a system
with j-th equation given by
wijt = αj + βjyit +
J∑
k=0
ajk log(Pikt) + ξij + δjt + εijt,(1)
where yit = log(xit) −
∑J
j=0 wijt log(Pj).
31 where ajk captures the effect of the price of
good k on the demand for good j and t indexes a half-year period and I decompose the
unobservable preference component of the model νijt = ξij + δjt + εijt into a household-
category specific (time-invariant) term ξij – that captures household preferences for each of
the food categories,– a time-category specific term, δjt and a random component εijt.32
Real expenditure is endogenous because budget shares wijt are used to deflate total
food expenditure x. Additionally, x may be jointly determined with the expenditure shares
allocated to each of the products. As I discuss in Section 5, I account for this potential
simultaneous equations bias by instrumenting current expenditure with current income.
29In Appendix A.6 I show that expenditures are monotonic in income.
30I tabulate the adjusted R2’s of different specifications for the polynomial on expenditure in Appendix
A.6.2.












Lewbel and Pendakur (2009) find this approximation of the deflator for nominal expenditure to provide
similar estimates to those obtained using the true deflator. I opt for the use of this approximation of the EASI
model as the simulated method of moments approach to deal with censoring becomes very computationally
intensive.
32Note that in contrast with the Almost Ideal Demand System from Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), with
this specification of the EASI model, household-category preferences do not enter the true deflator of nominal
expenditure. This is because the underlying cost function and hicksian demands that yield the model (1)
are such that the unobserved component νijt does not enter the true deflator of nominal food expenditure,
and household-specific characteristics enter only through this term.
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4.1 Prices
Note that, on the one hand, prices of the food products in the data are observed at the
barcode level, whereas the demand system is defined at the product category level. On the
other hand, the price of the outside good is not observed. In the rest of this section I explain
how I define the corresponding prices for each of the food categories and for the outside
good.
A natural way to define the price indices for the food categories {1, . . . , J}, (Pj)Jj=1,
without using the same expenditure weights for all consumers,33 is to use a weighted average
of the actual prices paid for a food product, with weights reflecting the product shares at
the national level for a given year.
Let j denote a food category, i the households in the sample and t a half-year period. I







with Ujt the set of barcodes u in category j and vut∑
u′∈Ujt vu′t
defined as the (nation-wide)
expenditure share on barcode u ∈ Ujt with respect to the rest of the barcodes in that
category at time t.34,35 For the remainder of the paper, I will refer to these price indices as
prices.
Turning to the outside good, I define its corresponding expenditure share, wi0t, as wi0t =
(xit −
∑J
j=1 Pijtqijt)/xijt. Then, in order to calculate its corresponding price index I use
quarterly prices compiled by the Council for Community and Economic Research in the
ACCRA Cost of Living Index Data, for 56 goods in more than 300 U.S. urban areas.36
Specifically, and following Zhen et al. (2013), I construct quarterly Laspeyres cost-of-living
indices for the ACCRA urban areas using national average prices from 2000 as the base and
item weights derived by the Council for Community and Economic Research from the 2000
Consumer Expenditure Survey.
33Which would have the undesirable property of implicitly assuming that preferences are homothetic
within product categories.
343.06% of the prices paid by households are missing. I impute missing prices using a regression of the
national average price for a barcode on indicators (and interactions) of market, quarter, characteristics of
the barcode and income of the household as described in Appendix A.7.1. The predicted prices were then
used to replace missing prices in the construction of price indices.
35The resulting price indices have a mean close to that of the average prices paid and have significant
dispersion. Table 7 in Appendix A.7.2 displays the summary statistics of both actual prices paid and the
price indices for some of the products in the data.
36A urban area corresponds to a Metropolitan or Micropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) or one or a group
of counties. I refer to these urban areas as ACCRA urban areas.
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I matched each household in the Nielsen data to a cost-of-living index based on their
census tract. A direct match was obtained if the household lives inside an ACCRA urban
area. Households outside all ACCRA urban areas were assigned to the cost-of-living index
corresponding to their nearest urban area.
Let CoLIit denote the Laspeyres cost-of-living index for all goods and services for house-
hold i in period t. The price index for for the numèraire good was obtained by solving for




As mention above, real expenditure, y, in equation (1) may be endogenous. Both because
budget shares wijt are part of the deflator of total food expenditure x, and because the sepa-
rability assumption underlying the demand model – which allows us to focus on the goods of
interest as functions of prices and total expenditure on these goods,– raises questions regard-
ing the possibility of simultaneity bias in the budget share equations of the model. Total
expenditure may be jointly determined with expenditure shares on the food categories.37
Following Banks et al. (1997), I use log-income as an instrument for expenditure.
Second, and more importantly, prices could be endogenous. This is the case whenever
there are unobserved determinants of price that influence demand.38 To account for this
potential endogeneity, I use “leave out” average prices paid for each barcode39 as instrumental
variables. In particular, for each household i I define the instrument for the price he faced
for barcode u, Pit(u), to be the period average price for barcode u, excluding the average
price in i’s market. The identifying assumption is that prices may covary across markets
due to common cost shocks but demand shocks are independent across markets.40 Then, the
37Note that expenditure endogeneity issues arising from the correlation between unobserved household
behavior and the allocation of food expenditure shares is somewhat alleviated by the fixed effects in the
budget share equations.
38Notice that in this case, quantity-quality trade-off within a food category pointed out by Deaton (1988)
is not a concern in my data. This is because two products with different qualities in the Nielsen Data have
different barcodes. Instead, the quantity-quality trade-off may arise to extent that households who value
quantity over quality are better at finding less expensive private label products than expensive name-brands.
39These are proxies for cost shifters in the spirit of Hausman (1996).
40Formally, suppose that the price that household i paid for barcode u in t is given by Pi,t(u) = rm(i),t(u)+
em(i),t(u). rm(i),t(u) denote observed determinants of price that may depend on the market m(i), and
em(i),t(u) denote unobserved determinants. The identifying assumption is that household specific demand
shocks are independent across markets so that em(i),t(u) = ηm(i)(u) + m(i),t(u) where the shocks ηm(i)(u)
are independent across markets.
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is defined as a weighted average of the price instruments corresponding to the barcodes that








Let Iit denote i’s real income in period t. Following Banks et al. (1997), I use log(Iit)
to instrument for expenditure.That is, I impose the identifying assumption that E(εit |
Ii1, . . . , IiT ; Πc(i),1, . . . ,Πc(i),T ) = 0.41








y I˜it + F log(Πc(i),t) + e
y
it.
5.1 Dealing with Censoring
A significant fraction of households do not consume some of the broad food categories used
for the analysis, which restricts the sample that can be used to estimate the model by almost
50% in each period. The literature offers several utility consistent approaches to deal with
censoring. In a setting where every food product can be censored, however, these approaches
are computationally infeasible. Instead, to account for corner solutions, I use a simulated
method of moments estimator developed by Gourieroux et al. (1993).
The Nielsen Homescan data is an unbalanced panel in which respondents’ mean duration
in the sample is of 6 years. The minimum length of time they stay in the sample is 1 year.
The maximum 11 – which is the total length of the panel. Most households consume at
least one of the products I consider for the analysis in each period in which they belong
to the sample. I restrict the sample to household-period pairs (i, t) (where a period spans
half a year) in which at least one of the products from each of the groups that I consider
is consumed. Only 53% of these household-period observations correspond to a bundle of
the J goods in which all of the expenditure shares are positive. Let the set of observations
41Note that the term
∑J
j=1 pic(i),j,tw¯jt is not a linear transformation of log(pic(i),j,t). The validity of this
instrument lies in the assumption that households face variation in income over time, while the rest of their
characteristics – in particular their consumption environment, – remains unchanged. In Section A.10.3, I
use different subsamples (of the positive sample) to estimate the parameters as a robustness check.
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with this property be the positive sample. Details about the positive sample can be found
in Appendix A.8.1.
Lee and Pitt (1986) characterize household consumption behavior under censoring build-
ing on Neary and Roberts (1980).42 Their approach uses the individual’s Kuhn–Tucker condi-
tions to construct virtual prices, which are reservation prices that would induce households
to consume exactly zero without imposing the non-negativity constraints. They compare
the virtual prices implied by corner solutions to the actual prices to derive the likelihood of
observing the households’ actual chosen bundle of goods.43 This approach becomes compu-
tationally infeasible as the number of censored goods grows.
A Tobit estimator (which would circumvent the computational difficulties of the approach
developed by Lee and Pitt (1986)) for the case of corner solutions in demand system esti-
mation, results in biased estimates (for systems with more than two goods). The problem of
this approach is that it fails to consider that consumers response to price depends on the set
of goods it consumes at corners. To deal with the significant presence of zero expenditure on
some goods without resorting to the computationally intensive approach developed by Lee
and Pitt (1986), I use a simulated method of moments estimator (Gourieroux et al. (1993)).
5.1.1 Indirect Inference
The model in (1) defined over the whole sample of households requires an additional as-
sumption on the distribution of the preference parameters ξij that specifies the dependence
of these parameters on the rest of the covariates. I specify the full structural model to be
given by,
(3)
wit = βyit + A log pit + ξi + δt + εit,
44
ξi ∼ N(ζ0 + ζ1y¯i,Σξ).
and denote the vector of all the parameters with γ.45
LetN denote the number of individuals and T the length of the panel in the observed data
given by observations of expenditure shares, real income and prices paid {wijt, yit, pijt, djt},
42Neary and Roberts (1980) characterized more generally household consumption behavior under quantity
constraints.
43These virtual prices are themselves functions of the household’s income and of the prices of the uncen-
sored goods. They can be calculated from the unconstrained demand and supply functions as I illustrate
in Appendix A.8.3. Further details about the approach developed by Lee and Pitt (1986) can be found in
Appendix A.8.2.







i = 1, . . . , N ; t = 1, . . . , T ; j = 1, . . . , J , where wijt is endogenous to the model and the
fitted values (pˆijt, yˆit)i,j,t, from the first stage equations pit = byit + C log(piit) + eit and
yit = b
yy˜it + F log(piit) + e
y
it are exogenous.
The auxiliary model is defined over the positive sample46 and consists of the within
transformation of the demand system in (3). Let the vector of parameters from the auxiliary











can be estimated using
the observed data. In particular, I use the within transformation and estimate the auxiliary














Given {yˆit, pˆijt, , djt}i=1,...,N ;t=1,...,T ;j=1,...,J and assumed values of γ, I use the structural
model to generate M statistically independent simulated data sets {w˜mijt(γ), yˆit, pˆijt, , djt},
m = 1, . . . ,M . Each of the M simulated data sets has N individuals and is constructed
using the same observations on the exogenous variables {yˆit, pˆijt}i,j,t. For each of the M













exactly as I estimate
θˆ: using the within transformation of the model and two stage least squares. Denote the
average of the estimated parameter vectors by θ˜(γ) = 1
M
∑M
m=1 θ˜m(γ). Indirect inference
generates an estimate γˆ of the structural parameters by choosing γ to minimize the distance
between θˆ and θ˜(γ) according to some metric. I take the Wald metric and follow Altonji
et al. (2013), adding the proportion of zeros together with the average level of expenditure
shares in each of the food categories as additional moments to match,










data − Zeros(γ)sim)2 + ωw(wdata −w(γ)sim)2
]
.(4)
where ωzeros and ωw denote scalar weights. Gourieroux et al. (1993) showed that the resulting
estimate γˆ is a consistent and asymptotically normal estimate of the true parameter γ.




has dimension J(3 +R+
J + (T − 1)). I impose symmetry of the Slutsky matrix to reduce number of price effects.
This reduces the dimension of γ to J(3+R+(J+1)/2+(T−1)). Adding the fraction of zeros
and the average levels of expenditure shares, yields a highly non-convex objective function
with many local optima making the minimization in (9) difficult to compute. Thus, I use a
simulated method of moments based on the MCMC algorithm developed by Chernozhukov
and Hong (2003). This derivative-free procedure is computationally attractive because it
46I refer to the sub-sample of household-semester combinations for which consumption of all goods is
positive as the positive sample.
47For short panels such as the one at hand, ξˆ
+
suffers from sampling bias.
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can deal with non-smooth objective functions and a high-dimensional parameter vector.48
I find the bias due to censoring to be small under the fixed effect specification I use. In
a cross-sectional analysis, the bias due to censoring could be sizable as it is suggested from
the discussion in Appendix A.8.4.
6 Results
In this section I report the elasticities implied by the estimates of the structural parame-
ters and perform a series of counterfactual exercises to characterize the impact of prices,
direct income effects and preferences. I then analyze the correlations of preferences with
socioeconomic and demographic characteristics.
6.1 Estimation Results
The budget elasticities of demand, that is, the elasticities of demand with respect to dis-
posable income or the expenditure level, are given by yj = 1 + βj/wj. The first column of
Table 2 reports the implied budget elasticities of demand.
Food categories have an income elasticity below 1 and the income elasticity for the outside
good is in line with what is found in the literature (see Zhen et al. (2013)). Note that the
table reports median income elasticities; however, income elasticities vary by income level
(as expenditure shares wj vary with income level). Interestingly, dividing the sweetened
beverages category into “juice” and the rest of the beverages (that is mainly composed by
soft drinks), we see a very different response to income. In particular, juice has a median
income elasticity of 0.3405 and the rest of the beverages of 0.1424.
These estimates imply that, upon an increase in disposable income, consumption of the
food categories would increase to different degrees. The food categories with the highest
income elasticities are produce, processed carbs, dairy and unprocessed grains. The rest of
the categories respond by less to changes in disposable income. In order to quantify the
overall effect of a change in disposable income on the quality of consumption, I make use of
the Healthy Eating Index in Section 6.2.2.
The Hicksian (compensated) price elasticities are given by ηjk =
ajk
wj
+ wk − 1(j = k),
and are reported in the second column of Table 2. All own compensated price elasticities
are negative, however, the eigen-value corresponding to the first category, “processed meat,”
48Details about the MCMC algorithm can be found in Appendix A.9.
21
Table 2: Median Income Elasticities.
Income Own Price Elasticities
Elasticities Hicksian Marshallian






+ w¯j − 1 ηjj − w¯jyj
Outside good 1.0741 -0.0086 -0.9667
Processed meat 0.2783 -0.0074 -0.0096
Fresh meat and seafood 0.1519 -0.0025 -0.0033
Unprocessed grains 0.3393 -0.6739 -0.6753
Processed carbs 0.3821 -0.4966 -0.5050
Sweetened beverages 0.2417 -0.9491 -0.9514
Produce 0.3987 -0.4298 -0.4365
Dairy 0.3587 -0.7972 -0.8042
Frozen/Canned food 0.2262 -0.4856 -0.4859
Sweeteners, Sweets 0.3072 -0.0128 -0.0149
Butter/Margarine/Oils 0.0946 -0.2979 -0.2980
Prepared food 0.3198 -0.9982 -1.0020
Note: This table reports the median income elasticities of demand and Hick-
sian and Marshallian own-price elasticities calculated using the estimates of the
structural parameters for each category j ∈ {1, . . . , J}. The point estimates are
reported in Table 10 in Appendix A.10.2.
is positive for all income groups. Thus, the Slutsky matrix is not negative semidefinite. The
third column, reports the implied Marshallian price elasticities given by ηjk − wjyk.
As discussed in Section 5, following Banks et al. (1997), I use log-income as an instrument
for expenditure. The validity of this instrument, lies in the assumption that households
face variation in income over time, while the rest of their characteristics – in particular
their consumption environment, – remains unchanged. As a check of the validity of this
assumption, in Appendix A.10.3, I use different subsamples (of the positive sample) to
compare the estimates of the parameters.
6.2 Interpretation of the results
With these estimates of the structural parameters, I evaluate alternative environments and
policies to understand how they may affect consumption behavior.
The predicted expenditure shares by households in income group I are given by
E(wijt | Iit = I) = βˆjE(yit | Iit = I) +
J∑
k=1
aˆjkE(log(pikt) | Iit = I) + E(ξˆij | Iit = I) + δˆtj.
I denote x(I) = E(x | Iit = I) and pijt = log(Pijt) in the remainder of the paper for ease of
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notation. Note that although the shares wijt are linear functions of real expenditure, they
are not necessarily linear functions of income (since real expenditure on food is a nonlinear
function of income).49
6.2.1 Price Effects
I start by analyzing the effect of equalizing relative prices across households. I set the relative
prices equal to the average relative prices paid by the highest income households, (pHj )Jj=1,
for all households. The counterfactual expenditure shares at this price level is given by




k + ξˆij(I) + γjt. At each income level I,
the difference








captures the adjustment in expenditure share allocated to category j if group I faced prices
pH1 , p
H
2 , . . . , p
H
J . That is, the right-hand side of (10) captures the average effect on i’s con-
sumption of category j of “changing” the relative price schedule from (pijt(I))Jj=1 to the
average relative price schedule from the top income group (pHj )Jj=1.
I then recover counterfactual quantities from these counterfactual shares by fixing expen-
diture on food products,
∑11
j=1 Pjqj, at a hundred dollars for all households.
I summarize the overall differences using the classification into healthy and unhealthy
products from Section 3 and plot the ratio of quantities bought of healthy products with
respect to quantities bought of unhealthy products in Figure 6. Note that these ratios are
not directly comparable to the ones in Section 3: these ratios compare quantities in grams
rather than expenditure shares. The average of these differences for each income group and
each product can be found in Appendix A.10.4.
As mentioned in Section 3.1 (and discussed in Appendix A.3), higher income households
face relatively higher prices for healthy products. Hence, increasing the relative prices of
healthy products to the level of higher income households, does not induce them to signifi-
cantly divert expenditure from unhealthy to healthy products.
To measure the overall effect on nutrition of this change in food baskets’ composition I
use the Healthy Eating Index (HEI), which I construct using the nutrients obtained from
the predicted quantities consumed of each good q1, q2, . . . , q11. The predicted nutrients are
computed under the assumption that households do not change the nutritional composition
of the set of barcodes they were buying within each category. That is, I assume that upon an
49Appendix A.10.1 shows the relationship between these two variables.
23
Figure 6: Predicted ratio of overall quantities purchased (measured in grams) of
healthy to unhealthy products by income group at own prices and at average prices from
the highest income group. The comparison illustrates the effect of equalizing prices at
the average level of the highest income group on the composition food baskets. Appendix
A.10.4 shows the effect product by product.
increase in consumption for a category, nutrients increase proportionately. For example, it
may increase the quantity of dairy it consumes but does not switch from buying low fat milk
to buying whole milk.50 I thus use the average nutritional content for each food category
and for each household, to impute average nutrients to the food basket {q1, q2, . . . , q11}.
I adjust these quantities proportionally so that the total calories from the proportional
basket {q˜1, q˜2, . . . , q˜11} contains exactly 1000 calories and I compute the HEI.The percentage
difference in predicted HEI scores between the top and bottom income groups is of 8.2%.
I compare the indices obtained by constructing these counterfactual baskets using the
predicted shares when prices are held at the average level of the highest income group,
E(wijt | Iit, pikt = pHk ). The average of these indices by income group is plotted in Figure 7.
The difference in HEI scores between the top and bottom income groups reduces only
slightly under the counterfactual price schedule by 8.03%. These small differences are driven
by the higher relative prices for some healthy products faced by higher income households:
the counterfactual prices effectively raise the relative prices for some healthy products for
lower income households – in particular, fruit and vegetables.
This counterfactual exercise must be interpreted with caution, however. Notice that I
use aggregated groups of products and compute the prices of these aggregated groups by
using weighted averages of the prices of the products in each group. Hence it could be the
50Or, if it does, then it lowers the amount of fat from other products in the dairy category in such a way
that the proportion of fat consumed from the dairy category remains constant.
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Figure 7: Average predicted Healthy Eating Index by income group at own
prices and at average prices from the highest income group. The comparison
illustrates the effect on the nutrient scores of equalizing prices at the average
level of the highest income group.
case that the higher relative price for the healthy category is a result of the way I aggregate
products rather than a true difference in relative prices. Indeed in Appendix A.3.2 I find
evidence suggesting that higher income households buy different and more expensive goods
than lower income households; more so in in the healthy category. Higher income households
could face relatively higher prices for healthy products if the higher demand for healthier
products in the area they lived led to an increase in prices. I compare relative price indeces
of the healthy and unhealthy categories by average household income level in Appendix
A.3.1. At the county level, there does not seem to be a strong correlation between average
household income level and the relative prices of healthy versus unhealthy products.
6.2.2 Budget Effect
The second counterfactual exercise I do is to implement a hypothetical policy that gives
subsidies for food expenditure to low-income households. To do this, I fix the prices and
preferences at the average level of the lowest income households and look at the predicted
expenditure shares at different expenditure levels; in particular, the average expenditure
levels of different income groups.
Figure 8 plots the ratio of amounts purchased of healthy with respect to unhealthy
products.
There are two features worth noticing in Figure 8. First, the joint effect of prices and
preferences is captured as the vertical distance between the light gray curve and dark gray
25
Figure 8: Predicted ratio of overall quantities purchased (measured in grams) of
healthy to unhealthy products by at prices and preferences from the lowest income group.
The comparison with the predicted ratios by income groups illustrates the effect of in-
creasing the food budget of the lowest income households to the average food expenditure
level of different income groups on the composition food baskets. Appendix A.11.3 shows
the effect product by product.
curve. This effect leads to an increase in the relative quantity of healthy to unhealthy prod-
ucts except for the highest income households. Second, the distance between the light gray
curve and the dashed line, captures the income effect on the aggregated healthy category.
Let R(yit, Pijt, ξijt) denote the relative quantity purchased of goods in the healthy to un-
healthy categories for household i. The averages 1|I|
∑
i∈I R(yit, Pijt, ξijt), which I denote for
simplicity by R(yI , P I , ξI), for each income group are scattered in dark gray in Figure 8. I
denote with L the lowest income group, that is the group of households with incomes under
$20,000. Similarly, I use H to denote the highest income group, which is the group of house-
holds with incomes above $100,000. The counterfactual averages R(yI , PL, ξL) are plotted
in the light gray curve. The distance between R(yL, PL, ξL) and the dashed line, through
R(yH , PL, ξL), captures the income effect from shifting disposable income from the one of
low-income level households, L, to the level of high-income level households, H.
The proportion of of the budget allocated to food products with respect to that corre-
sponding to the outside good depends on the income elasticity each income group has for
the outside good. However, for all income groups it implies an increase in food expenditure;
more pronounced for lower income groups and less pronounced for higher income groups.
R(yI , PL, ξL) ≤ R(yI′ , PL, ξL) for I < I ′ implies that the healthy category is a normal good
relative to disposable income for food – rather than to income.
Indeed, consumers in this model can be thought of as allocating their food budget be-
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tween the healthy and the unhealthy categories. A shift out of the budget constraint, keeping
the relative prices of different goods fixed, leads to an increase in the consumption level of
all normal goods, and a decrease in consumption of inferior goods. Hence, this comparison
suggests that the healthy category is relatively normal – and the unhealthy category, rel-
atively inferior.51 Analogous figures by food product – showing graphically the estimates
from Table 10, – can be found in Appendix A.11.3.
I measure the overall effect on nutrition of this change in disposable income as above: I
normalize the response to this shift in prices by converting the counterfactual shares into the
implied quantities by fixing expenditure on food products,
∑11
j=1 Pjqj, at a hundred dollars
for all households and construct the predicted HEI. The average counterfactual HEI at prices
and preferences of the lowest income group is plotted in Figure 9. Each point (x, y) on the
light gray curve represents the counterfactual HEI that households from the lowest income
group would have, y, if their food budget was increased to the level of income group x. This
implies that the lowest income households, upon a increase in the food budget to the level of
the highest income households, would change the composition of their food baskets, so that
their HEI would almost match the HEI of the highest income households.
Figure 9: Average predicted Healthy Eating Index by income group at prices and
preferences from the lowest income group in dark gray. Each pair (x, y) on the dark
gray curve represents the counterfactual HEI that households from the lowest income
group would have, y, if their food budget was increased to the level of income group x.
I find that the change in overall quantity purchased of healthy and unhealthy products
translates into a two-point increase in the nutrient score of low-income households, closing
51I use the terms relatively normal and relatively inferior to emphasize that I refer to normal and inferior
goods with respect to food budget rather than to income. As can be verified in Table 2, all food categories
are necessities.
27
over 40% of the gap with high-income households. The rise in the nutrient score reflects
changes in the components of the index. Two of the components are grams of protein and
calories out of sugar, plotted in Figure 10. The effect of increasing the budget of the lowest
income households is represented by the light gray curve. Increasing the budget of the
lowest income group to the level of the highest income group, leads to an increase of protein
consumption from 23.5 grams to the dashed lined at 24.5 grams (a 4.3% increase). Instead, it
lowers the calories out sugar from 139 to the dashed line at 100 kcal. (almost 40% decrease).
Figure 10: Average predicted protein and calories from sugar by income group at
prices and preferences from the lowest income group in light gray. The dark gray curve
plots the predicted protein and calories from sugar at own preferences and prices. The
vertical distance between the point corresponding to the lowest income group (where
the two curves cross) and the dashed line represents the counterfactual quantity (in
grams on the left panel and in calories on the right panel) that households from the
lowest income group would purchase if their food budget was increased to the level of
the highest income group.
6.2.3 Preference Effects
The last counterfactual exercise I consider consists on equalizing the preference parameters
to the level of the highest income group. That is, I consider
wijt(I)− E(wijt | Iit = I, ξHj ) = ξij(I)− ξHj .(6)
The right-hand side of (6) captures the effect on i’s consumption of category j of “changing”
his preference for j. Again, bv
I summarize the change in composition of the food baskets of consumers by comparing
the ration of quantities bought of healthy products with respect to quantities bought of
unhealthy products as plotted in Figure 11, which shows that this ratio would increase the
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ratio of quantities consumed of the healthy category for all income groups. The average of
these differences for each income group and each product can be found in Appendix A.10.4.
Figure 11: Predicted ratio of overall quantities purchased (measured in grams) of
healthy to unhealthy products by income group at own preferences and at average pref-
erences from the highest income group. The comparison illustrates the effect of equal-
izing preferences at the average level of the highest income group on the composition
food baskets. Appendix A.10.4 shows the effect product by product.
I compare the Healthy Eating indices obtained using the implied quantities fixing expen-
ditures for all households at the same level when preferences are held at the level of the top
income group, E(wijt | Iit = I, ξHi ). The average of these indices by income group is plotted
in figure Figure 12.
The difference in scores between the highest and lowest income groups decreases by
approximately 44% when the preferences are held at the average level from the top income
group.
The overall contribution of prices, preferences and budget to the HEI can be broken down
through the following decomposition. Let H(yit, Pijt, ξijt) define the HEI of household i with
his corresponding expenditure, price schedule and preferences. The darker curves in figures
7, 12 and 9 plot the averages 1|I|
∑
i∈I H(yit, Pijt, ξijt) for each income group I, which I denote
by H(yI , P I , ξI).
log
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Figure 12: Average predicted Healthy Eating Index by income group at own preferences
and at average preferences from the highest income group. The comparison illustrates
the effect on the nutrient scores of equalizing preferences at the average level of the
highest income group.
where the the first term in the right hand side measures the contribution of the preference
effect, the second term captures the price effect, and the third term captures the effect of a
shift in budget – as that the only difference between the bottom and top group once prefer-
ences and prices are equalized. These terms equal, respectively, 0.0150, 0.0032 and 0.0160.
That is the preference contribution to the gap between H(yH , PH , ξH) and H(yL, PL, ξL) is
43.88%, the price contribution is 9.31%, and the budget has a contribution of 46.82%.
6.3 Preference Parameters and Demographics
Preferences for healthy products could be either innately different for different income groups,
or shaped by long-term exposure to characteristics that are linked to own-income or to the
income level of the households’ environment. In this section I show that irrespective of
the income level of their zipcode, their race and the hours of employment of the heads of
the household, households with higher income have higher preferences for healthful prod-
ucts, suggesting that own-income plays a larger role than the environment of the household.
Moreover, conditional on income, households with more educated heads of the household
tend to have higher preferences for healthful foods.
In Appendix A.12 I show the correlation of preferences with other variables product by
product. Overall, I find that income is positively correlated with preferences for healthy
products (this is consistent with the findings of Allcott et al. (2017) and Handbury (2013)).
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Moreover, conditional on income level, more educated households tend to have higher
preferences for healthier goods. Households with higher socioeconomic characteristics tend
to have higher taste for healthier food groups, in particular as measured by education. To see
this, I regress the estimated preference parameters on education, and income quartile dum-
mies and their interactions, together with zipcode-level-income fixed effects. The estimated
parameters from these regressions are reported in Table 16a in Appendix A.12. Adding
dummies for race and number of employment hours yields similar estimates.
I define the preference for the healthy category ghi as the sum of the preference parameters
for the products that are classified as healthy with respect to the sum of all preferences




, to summarize the association of preferences for healthy
products with different demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. The correlation of
these preferences for healthy products separately by education group at each income level
are plotted in Figure 13 (and similar figures by product can be found in Appendix A.12.)
Figure 13: Correlation of these preferences separately by education group at each
income level.
Healthier products, such as vegetables and fresh meat require more preparation time than
frozen, canned and prepared food. Thus, longer employment hours may induce unhealthier
consumption.52
Figure 14 plots the correlation of preferences for healthful products separately by em-
ployment hours of the male head by household income. Although the correlation between
preferences for healthy products and range of hours worked is consistent with this hypothesis,
income seems to play a larger role.
52Note that non-market (or leisure) time available for activities such as shopping for goods and food
preparation is not increasing in income. In Appendix A.5 I tabulate time-use by income quintile.
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Figure 14: Correlation of preferences for healthy products separately by number of
employment hours of the heads at each income level.
I find that the preference parameters correlate with reported race which can be correlated
with the cultural identity of individuals. If race was in fact correlated with cultural identity,
the fact that households of different phenotype display different consumption patterns would
align with preferences being sticky (Atkin (2016)). Unfortunatedly, the Kilts Center does
not collect any variable related to country of origin in the Nielsen Homescan data. Hence I
cannot further explore this dimension.53 Asians in particular seem to have higher taste for
healthier products (Figure 15).
Finally, I use the ACS to group zipcodes by average household-level income. Ranking
zipcodes by their average income level, I can look at the correlation between preferences for
healthy products by own-household income separately for different zipcode-levels of income.
I find that conditional on income, zip-level income correlates with preferences.
53There are also significant differences in preferences by Hispanic origins. However, only 5% of the sample
resports having Hispanic origins.
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Figure 15: Correlation of preferences for healthy products separately for each racial
group at each income level.
Figure 16: Correlation of preferences for healthy products separately zip-level income
at each income level.
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7 Conclusion
This paper studies the contribution of prices, food expenditure and preferences to the dif-
ferences in consumption patterns across income groups. I estimate a demand system for
different food products using longitudinal variation, which allows me to disentangle the di-
rect income and price effects from preferences.
While previous research has compared the consumption baskets of households at different
income levels, I exploit within and across household variation in the level and composition
of food expenditure. This source of variation allows me to disentangle the direct income
effect – e.g., a positive shock in current disposable income, – from the effect of permanent
differences across individuals (or preferences.)
Performing a series of counterfactual exercises with the structural estimates of the model
and making use of nutritional data to map changes in consumption into a nutrition score, I
find that disposable income and preferences have a predominant and quantitatively similar
role in explaining food consumption differences across income groups. Instead, prices have
limited effects since low-income households face relatively lower prices for healthy goods.
The pure income effect and the time invariant preference parameters speak to different
aspects of policy development. The pure income effect is relevant for programs that are
designed to shift the food budget of households. The preference parameters, instead, inform
policies targeted at shaping the environment of different socioeconomic groups. My results
suggest that policies that increase the food budget of low-income families can have a positive
effect on nutrition quality. A limitation of the results is that they only speak to policies that
affect the disposable income for food products.54 Moreover, even with extreme counterfactual
policies in which the entire gap in food budget is closed, differences in consumption remain
due to differences in preferences.
I take a first step in uncovering the nature of preferences by analyzing their association
with socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. I find that irrespective of the income
level of their zipcode, their race and the hours of employment of the heads of the household,
households with higher income have higher preferences for healthful products, suggesting that
own-income plays a larger role than the environment of the household. Moreover, conditional
on income, households with more educated heads of the household tend to have higher
preferences for healthful foods. These associations between preferences and socioeconomic
characteristics hint to a nuanced relationship between income and preferences and suggest
that a natural next step in explaining the drivers of nutrition inequality is to formally analyze
54Recent literature analyzing the marginal propensity to consume food out of food stamp benefits, suggests
that this program succeeds at increasing food budget.
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the components of the time-invariant preference parameters. In particular, an interesting
question for future research is whether one could design a policy intervention that mitigates
the differences in preferences for food.
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A.1 Food Consumption and Nutrient Intake
Table 3: Average daily intake of food by food source and demographic characteristics, 2007-10
Food group Total At home Away from home
Total Restaurant Fast food School Other
Fruits (cups)
Total population 1.05 0.94 0.12 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.05
Children 1.08 0.90 0.18 0.01 0.02 0.10 0.05
Adults 1.05 0.95 0.10 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.06
Lower income 1.01 0.89 0.12 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.05
Higher income 1.08 0.96 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05
Vegetables: total (cups)
Total population 1.42 0.96 0.47 0.18 0.17 0.02 0.10
Children 0.92 0.59 0.33 0.07 0.14 0.07 0.05
Adults 1.59 1.08 0.51 0.21 0.18 0.01 0.11
Lower income 1.26 0.88 0.38 0.11 0.16 0.03 0.08
Higher income 1.53 1.01 0.52 0.22 0.17 0.02 0.11
Dark green vegetables (cups)
Total population 0.11 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01
Children 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Adults 0.14 0.10 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01
Lower income 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
Higher income 0.13 0.10 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01
Red and orange vegetables (cups)
Total population 0.37 0.26 0.11 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.02
Children 0.27 0.17 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02
Adults 0.40 0.28 0.12 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.03
Lower income 0.33 0.24 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.02
Higher income 0.39 0.27 0.13 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.03
Tomatoes (cups)
Total population 0.28 0.19 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.02
Children 0.22 0.13 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.01
Adults 0.31 0.21 0.10 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.02
Lower income 0.26 0.18 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.01
Higher income 0.30 0.19 0.11 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.02
Dairy (cups)
Total population 1.77 1.32 0.45 0.10 0.19 0.08 0.08
Children 2.16 1.52 0.64 0.08 0.20 0.29 0.08
Adults 1.64 1.26 0.38 0.11 0.19 0.01 0.08
Lower income 1.67 1.26 0.41 0.06 0.18 0.11 0.06
Higher income 1.83 1.36 0.47 0.13 0.20 0.06 0.09
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Food group Total At home Away from home
Total Restaurant Fast food School Other
Refined grains (ounces)
Total population 5.68 3.75 1.93 0.51 0.89 0.13 0.40
Children 5.84 3.87 1.97 0.30 0.84 0.48 0.35
Adults 5.63 3.71 1.92 0.58 0.91 0.02 0.41
Lower income 5.67 3.90 1.77 0.37 0.87 0.18 0.35
Higher income 5.69 3.65 2.04 0.60 0.90 0.10 0.43
Whole grains (ounces)
Total population 0.78 0.72 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03
Children 0.62 0.56 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.02
Adults 0.83 0.77 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03
Lower income 0.67 0.62 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
Higher income 0.85 0.77 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03
Protein foods (ounces)
Total population 5.68 3.83 1.85 0.65 0.72 0.09 0.39
Children 4.33 2.88 1.45 0.28 0.63 0.31 0.22
Adults 6.13 4.15 1.98 0.77 0.75 0.02 0.44
Lower income 5.29 3.67 1.62 0.45 0.71 0.12 0.33
Higher income 5.93 3.94 1.99 0.77 0.73 0.07 0.42
Added sugars (tsp)
Total population 17.73 13.17 4.56 0.98 1.59 0.28 1.72
Children 18.43 13.17 5.26 0.87 1.70 0.99 1.70
Adults 17.50 13.17 4.33 1.01 1.55 0.04 1.73
Lower income 18.59 14.26 4.32 0.78 1.67 0.38 1.51
Higher income 17.18 12.48 4.71 1.10 1.54 0.21 1.86
Oils (grams)
Total population 21.15 13.75 7.40 2.38 3.16 0.39 1.47
Children 17.97 11.30 6.67 1.17 3.19 1.33 0.98
Adults 22.20 14.56 7.64 2.78 3.15 0.08 1.64
Lower income 19.12 12.84 6.28 1.56 3.10 0.48 1.15
Higher income 22.43 14.32 8.11 2.90 3.20 0.33 1.68
Solid fats (grams)
Total population 37.44 24.44 13.00 3.53 5.51 0.88 3.08
Children 36.08 23.29 12.79 2.02 5.13 3.18 2.47
Adults 37.89 24.82 13.07 4.03 5.64 0.12 3.28
Lower income 35.72 24.09 11.63 2.48 5.48 1.21 2.46
Higher income 38.53 24.67 13.86 4.19 5.53 0.67 3.47
* Source: This information was obtained through the USDA Food Consumption and Nutrient Intake
data (https://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/FoodConsumption/).
These average intakes are based on the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES)
for 2007-2010 using two-day averages.
Individuals who completed two-day intake recalls, were 2 years and older, and were not pregnant or
lactating. Children are those age 2-19 and adults are age 20 and older. The 185 percent income
poverty line is the income threshold separating lower and higher income households.
42
A.2 Details about the Data
A.2.1 Nielsen Homescan Data
The Nielsen Homescan Data provides a detailed product hierarchy. About 3 million products
(identified by their barcode, or UPC code) are classified into 10 broad departments, from
which I focus on those related with food (in particular, Dry grocery, Frozen Foods, Dairy,
Deli, Packaged Meat, Fresh Produce); this reduces the number of barcodes to 2 million.
Nielsen defines two more levels of hierarchy.
Nielsen data does not contain actual annual household income. Instead, panelists select
one of the following ranges in which their income falls: less than $5000, $5000-$7999, $8000-
$9999, $10,000-$11,999, $12,000-$14,999, $15,000-$19,999, $20,000-$24,999, $25,000-$29,999,
$30,000-$34, 999, $35,000-$39,999, $40,000-$44,999, $45,000-$49,999, $50,000-$59,999, $60,000-
$69,999, $70,000-$99,999 and over $100,000 (for most years).55 The bottom four income
groups (up to the $11,999 limit) represent less than 5% of the sample each year and their
probability weights are, on average, almost double the ones for individuals with income ranges
between $12,000 and $100,000. Thus I group these bottom four income groups together to
analyze consumption patterns by income.56
Nielsen selects panelists trying to match the demographics of the U.S. population on
household size, household income, age of the head of household, race, Hispanic origin, edu-
cation and occupation of the head of the household, presence of children and Nielsen county
size. The sample can be analyzed at the level of Scantrack markets, which typically consist
of a set of adjacent counties and are shown in Figure 17.
55For 2006-2009, the upper ranges are instead $100,000 - $124,999, $125,000 - $149,999, $150,000 -
$199,999, and over $200,000.
56Household income is recorded two years prior to the panel year. Panelists are asked in the fall prior
to the start of the panel year for their total annual income as of year-end of the previous calendar year. I
use the income information reported each year as current income following the literature that uses income
information from the Nielsen Homescan Data (see Jaravel (2016), Fally and Faber (2016).)
43
Figure 17: Nielsen total U.S. Scantrack markets.
The subsample of households who report random weighted items, however, can only be
analyzed at the level of the country.
A.2.2 Gladson Nutritional Data
The Gladson Nutrition Database includes detailed nutritional attributes of thousands of
food products. Unfortunately, it only covers a fraction of the products registered by the
respondents of the Nielsen Homescan Data.
The linkage is further complicated by the fact that the nutrients in the Gladson Data
are measured as a function of serving size. This serving size is, in many cases, measured in
unconventional units (such as “one 4-inch diameter cooked pancake”), which combined with
the large fraction of products that have a vague number of servings per container (some
have “varies” as the number of servings per container) makes many of the matched barcodes’
nutritional contents futile.
Once I restrict the observations in the Gladson data to those for which I can redefine the
serving size in metric units, the matching rate by year is as shown below.
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Figure 18: Proportion of products in the Nielsen Homescan Data for which I can merge their corresponding
nutritional contents from the Gladson Data.
Fortunately, the matching rate is similar across income groups.
Out of the total of 1,692,946 barcodes in the food categories considered, 14.12% is
matched directly.
Using the products’ brand and attributes – including the description of the product (for
example “canned tomato, whole”) and characteristics such as organic claim, salt content and
the “common consumer name description” and “variety description” (when available) in the
Nielsen Homescan Data, I grouped barcodes without nutritional information into detailed
product groups. I used analogous information in the Gladson nutritional data (based on the
brand, organic claim, sodium content, and product description) and matched the resulting
product groups. This method allows me to project this information to 61.11%. Using all the
characteristics but brand, I regroup the barcodes with missing information in both datasets
and match 42.71% of the remaining products without nutritional information (this yields a
total of 87.96% of products with nutrients).
A.3 The Role of Prices in Nutritional Disparities
Lower income households pay relatively lower prices for healthy products than for unhealthy
ones. To see this, I define price indices to compare the prices for products in the healthy
category with respect to those in the unhealthy category. I use a weighted average of the
actual prices paid for a product, with weights reflecting the product shares at the national
level for a given year. In particular, let j denote food categories, i the households in the
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with Ujt(i) the set of barcodes u in category j that i bought in t and vut∑
u′∈Ujt vu′t
defined
as the (nation-wide) expenditure share on barcode u – these are the price indices I use for
estimation (where shorten t to half year periods).
In Figure 19, I plot the ratio of the average price indices in the healthy category with













Figure 19: Average relative prices paid for products
in the healthy category with respect to products in the
unhealthy category by income group.
Note that ρi is below 1 if the price index of healthy products is below that of unhealthy
products. Hence, Figure 19 implies that lower income households pay relatively lower prices
for the healthy products they buy with respect to the unhealthy products they buy.
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A.3.1 Relative Prices of the Healthy and Unhealthy products by income
To compare differences in prices paid across counties, similarly, I define the aggregate price







with Ujt(c) the set of barcodes u in category j that were bought in county c at t and vut∑
u′∈Ujt vu′t
defined as the (nation-wide) expenditure share on barcode u.












Figure 20: Counties are ranked by average household income level.
This suggests that the relative price indexes of the healthy to the unhealthy products are
not strongly correlated with county-level demographics.




where the dashed gray line is the 45-degree line.
This shows that, at the barcode-level, the correlation between county-level household
income and prices is weak.
A.3.2 Higher income households buy more expensive products than lower in-
come households
Consider the relative price defined as the coefficient on a household income dummy in a
regression of the log unit price paid by a household for a product on food category,57 fixed
effects and demographic controls. That is, let the relative price of a product relative to the




βy1(incomei = y) + αDi +
∑
j∈J
γj1(categoryu = j) + εiu
where i indicates household, t a time period, u indicates barcode and Di denotes a vector of
dummies indicating demographic characteristics and 1(categoryu = j) are product category
controls.
The β coefficients, plotted with light gray squares in Figure 21, tell us that the prices
57Where recall, a food category is a group of food products that was found to be either positively or
negatively correlated with chronic conditions.
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Figure 21: Relative price defined as the coefficient
on a household income dummy in a regression of the
log unit price paid by a household for a product on food
category fixed effects and demographic controls.
paid by households for products in a food category are increasing with income.58 These
prices could be higher because higher income households pay more for the same products in
a category, or because they buy different products.
But when focusing on a narrower classification of products, namely modules (these are
groups of barcodes such as “canned tomato, whole”, we see that this is not completely driven





by1(incomeit = y) + αDi +
∑
j∈J
δj1(moduleu = j) + εiut.
plotted in medium gray diamonds, show a flatter slope, and the parameters corresponding
to the most detailed classification products, that of barcodes, is almost completely flat.
This is evidence that part of the positive correlation that we see between prices paid and
income at the food category level, is driven by the products chosen within each category by
households of different income levels. That is, higher income households buy different and
more expensive products than lower income households – consistent with Handbury (2013),
Kaplan and Menzio (2016) and Broda et al. (2009).
58Statistically insignificant coefficients at the 95% confidence level were replaced by zero.
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Moreover, separating products into the healthful and unhealthful categories defined above
– and defining βˆy and bˆy by running the regressions above separately for the healthy and the
unhealthy products,– we see that this pattern is more pronounced among the healthy cate-
gory as seen in Figure 22. Implying that high-income households buy products corresponding
to the healthful category from different modules.
Figure 22: Relative prices defined as the coefficient on a household income dummy
in a regression of the log unit price paid by a household for a product on food category
fixed effects and demographic controls, separately by healthful and unhealthful products.
A.4 Differential Nutrient Consumption
A.4.1 Caloric Composition
Lower income groups consume more saturated fats and – although they source a similar share
of their calories out of carbohydrates, – they consume more sugar. The left panel in figure
(23) plots the proportion of calories obtained from saturated fats with respect to households
from the top income group.59 The right panel plots the share of saturated fat calories out
of the total fat calories.
Similarly, the left panel in figure (24) plots the proportion of calories obtained from
sugar with respect to households from the top income group and the right panel the share
of calories obtained from sugar out of total calories from carbohydrates.
59Saturated fats’ consumption is associated with increase in the levels of low-density lipoprotein (LDL)
cholesterol which is positively correlated coronary heart disease. There is no consensus in the medical
community regarding the effect of saturated fat consumption, however, there is evidence that replacing
saturated fats for unsaturated fatty acids lowers LDL cholesterol and increases high-density lipoprotein
(HDL) cholesterol that is associated with a reduction in risk for heart disease (Mozaffarian et al. (2010)).
Substitution of saturated fats for carbohydrates does not seem to have positive effects. Trans fat consumption
has been consistently found to be linked to cardiometabolic diseases (Micha et al. (2017)) however, this type
of fat is not reported consistently in the Gladson Nutritional Data.
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Figure 23: Proportion of calories obtained from saturated fats with respect to
the top income group.
Figure 24: Proportion of calories obtained from sugar with respect to the top
income group.
A.4.2 Components of the Healthy Eating Index
The Healthy Eating Index is a score based on quantities per 1000 kcal. consumed of different
food groups.
To take this measure to the data, I grouped together the components corresponding to
fruits and vegetables into the category “fruits and vegetables.” Similarly, I use nutritional
information on proteins rather than separately quantify the consumption of total protein
foods and seafood and plant proteins.
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Table 4: Components of the Healthy Eating Index.
Component Max. Std for Std forpoints Max. Points zero points
Fruits and 20 ≥ 2.5 cups 0Vegetables
Grains 10 ≥ 1.5 ounce 0
Dairy 10 ≥ 1.3 cup 0
Protein 10 ≥ 3.3 ounce 0
Fatty Acids 10 1.2 ≤ (fat - satfat)/satfat ≤ 2.5 0
Refined Grains 10 ≤ 1.8 oz ≥ 4.3 oz
Sodium 10 ≤ 1.1 gram ≥ 2.0 grams
Empty Calories
Sugar Calories 10 ≤ 6.5% of energy ≥ 26% of energy
Saturated Fat Calories 10 ≤ 8% of energy ≥ 16% of energy
* Source: This information was obtained through the USDA Food Consumption and Nutrient Intake
data (https://www.cnpp.usda.gov/healthyeatingindex).
Note: For consumption levels between the standard for maximum points and the standard for zero
points, I do a linear interpolation to assign a number of points between 0 and the maximum attainable
points.
Figure 25: Average consumption in grams per 1000 kcal. of dietary components that are assigned more
points the higher the consumption.
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Figure 26: Average consumption in grams per 1000 kcal. of dietary components that are assigned less
points the higher the consumption.
53
A.5 Time use by Income Group
Time-use category (hours per week) USA (2005-2007)
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Panel 1: Market work 27.78 35.46 36.08 38.74 38.01
Core market work 25.05 32.56 33.00 35.27 34.51
Commuting 2.08 2.47 2.69 3.04 3.15
Other income activities 0.22 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.11
Panel 2: Nonmarket work 18.75 18.43 19.42 18.70 18.98
Home production 12.23 11.32 11.81 11.09 10.87
Obtaining goods and services/shopping 4.93 5.19 5.45 5.51 5.97
Garden & Pet 1.59 1.92 2.16 2.10 2.15
Panel 3: Care for others 6.52 6.50 7.23 7.19 7.57
Child care 5.27 5.33 6.05 6.30 6.80
Other care 1.25 1.17 1.17 0.89 0.77
Panel 4: Leisure 37.38 33.59 32.01 30.28 30.13
TV 20.70 16.83 15.27 13.57 11.92
Socializing 7.73 7.00 7.14 6.54 6.69
Exercise & Sports 1.38 2.12 2.04 2.43 3.34
Reading 1.16 1.45 1.66 1.96 2.26
Civic 1.57 1.92 1.77 2.06 2.24
Panel 5: ESP 75.25 71.89 71.71 71.07 71.31
Sleeping 62.78 58.68 57.78 56.94 56.74
Eating 7.33 8.13 8.58 8.75 9.49
Personal care 5.15 5.09 5.35 5.38 5.08
Total market-, nonmarket-work 46.53 53.88 55.50 57.45 57.00
Total market-, nonmarket-work + care 53.06 60.39 62.73 64.64 64.56
Leisure, sleeping 100.16 92.27 89.78 87.21 86.87
Leisure, esp 112.64 105.48 103.72 101.34 101.44
Panel 6: Other 2.31 2.13 1.55 2.01 1.99
Education 1.27 0.97 0.48 0.93 0.79
Not classified 1.03 1.16 1.07 1.08 1.20
Panel 7: Travelling 7.83 8.87 9.50 9.96 10.36
Underlying sample size 4663 4241 4344 2873 3708
* Based on data from the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) 2005-2006-2007 (pooled) (see Olmos
(2017) for a detailed discussion about time allocation by income groups).
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A.6 Details of the specification of the demand system
A.6.1 The EASI demand model
One of the most commonly used is to specify the cost function, c(p, u), and then recover
the Marshallian demands using Shephard’s lemma and duality60 (the Almost Ideal Demand
System of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) and its Quadratic version of Banks et al. (1997)
are constructed with this approach).
Lewbel and Pendakur (2009) take a similar approach, but do not require invertibility
of the expenditure function to recover the indirect utility. Instead, they narrow the set
of expenditure functions one can choose from to construct the demand system, to a set of
functions c(p, u) for which there is a cardinalization of the utility level u that equals an affine
transformation of the log Stone Index deflated expenditures log(x)−∑Jj=1 wj log(pj), where
log(x) denotes total expenditures, wj the budget share allocated to product j, and log(pj)
its corresponding log price.
This cardinalization makes the intersection point between Hicksian demands and implicit
Marshallian demands, u = y; thus avoiding the need of recovering the indirect utility function
while leaving the functional form of m(·) is completely unrestricted in their dependence on
implicit utility y (and observable preference shifters if added) – at the cost of having the
Marshallian demands implicitly defined.61
The intuition behind the model is as follows (a detailed description can be found in the
online appendix of Lewbel and Pendakur (2009)). By specifying the expenditure function
c(p, u) to take the functional form from a particular class of functions, even if we cannot
invert this function to obtain indirect utility using c(p, ψ(p, x)) = x (i.e. even if there is
no closed form solution for indirect utility ψ(·, ·)), there will be a known function G(·, ·, ·)
depending on both p and c(p, u) (but not necessarily only p and c(p, u), relaxing the need of
obtaining ψ(·, ·) such that u = ψ(p, c(p, u))) together with ω(p, u) such that
u = G(p, c(p, u), ω(p, u)).
This identity implicitly defines u. We may define implicit utility y by y = G(p, x,w). Then
60Namely, the identity, h(p, u) = ∂c(p,u)∂p together with
g(p, x) = h(p, ψ(p, x)),
where ψ(p, x) is obtained from inverting c(p, ψ(p, x)) = x.
61This implies endogeneity by construction, however, it can be easily dealt with and Lewbel and Pendakur
(2009) find little empirical difference between the coefficients of the model in which endogeneity is accounted
for and that in which it is not.
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by construction u = y and y is defined by observables through G.62
Shephard’s lemma implies the Hicksian demand system w = ω(p, u), where w denote
observed budget shares – which depend on expenditure x and prices p,– and ω(p, u) denote




, . . . , pJhJ (p,u)
c(p,u)
)
– that depend on utility u and
prices. Since g(p, x) = h(p, u), then we get the implicit Marshallian demand system
w = ω(p, x).
This approach is particularly useful because the functional form of m(·) is completely
unrestricted in their dependence on implicit utility y (and observable preference shifters if
added). Hence, Engel curves may have any shape and any degree of variety across goods. In
particular, it fits the tails of complex Engel curves better than the flexible QUAIDS model
which are of particular interest for the paper. Additionally, nothing about the shape of Engel
curves need to be known in advance and both observed and unobserved preference shifters
can be easily introduced into the model. Finally, the functional form of budget shares is
completely unrestricted and Gorman’s rank three limit does not apply.
A.6.2 Specification of the Model






it + A log pit + ξi + εit.
I let the degrees of the polynomial in expenditure, R, depend on category j – thus I denote
it by Rj,– as follows. Let Θj =
∑J






I consider the correlation of wj with y and its exponents, conditional on Θj, by comparing
the adjusted R2’s of the regression of wj on Θj, with that of wj on y and Θj, of wj on y, y2
and Θj, y, y2, y3 and Θj and so on.63 Table 5 below shows summary statistics of the R2’s
corresponding to model (7), varying Rj from 0 – no income effect – to 4 – a quartic term in
income. Table 6 shows summary statistics of the ratio between these R2’s. We see how the
62It is the dependence of y = G(p, x,w) on w what make the resulting demand system implicit. The
reason being that the demand equations will have wj on the left and right hand side.
63Recall, the adjusted R2 is adjusted for the number of predictors in the model. The adjusted R2
increases only if the new term improves the model more than would be expected by chance. It decreases
when a predictor improves the model by less than expected by chance.
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fit of the model – adjusting for the number of predictors in the model – improves by almost
30% on average when introducing a linear income term. The fit improves on average by 3%
when introducing a quadratic term of income and by half a percentage point when adding a
cubic term.
Table 5: Adjusted R2
R2 of model (7) when Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Rj = 0 0.00659 0.0066007 0.0002295 0.023457
Rj = 1 0.0081043 0.0081393 0.0002363 0.0281206
Rj = 2 0.0083331 0.008436 0.0002449 0.0307689
Rj = 3 0.008379 0.0085083 0.0002453 0.0313763
Rj = 4 0.0084074 0.0085502 0.000245 0.0317141
Table 6: Percent increase in adjusted R2
Ratio of R2 in (7) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Rj = 1 with respect to Rj = 0 1.287574 0.3603229 1.00138 2.452227
Rj = 2 with respect to Rj = 1 1.034687 0.0635564 0.9994741 1.343368
Rj = 3 with respect to Rj = 2 1.005887 0.0116591 0.9995941 1.062162
Rj = 4 with respect to Rj = 3 1.003648 0.0071672 0.9989591 1.038382
A.7 Price Indices
A.7.1 Price imputation
3.06% of the prices paid by households are missing. I impute missing prices by regressing
the average price of a barcode on market, brand, and quarter indicators; the interactions
between between brand and quarter indicators, and between quarter and market64 indicators;
an indicator of whether the product is organic, whether the package includes a claim of
organically grown or organic ingredients and an indicator of income of the household.
The regression was separately estimated for each food category. The predicted prices
were then used to replace missing prices in the construction of price indices.
64By markets I refer to the local markets defined by Nielsen and described in Appendix A.2.1.
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A.7.2 Details of the Price indices







with Ujt the set of barcodes u in category j and vut∑
u′∈Ujt vu′t
defined as the (nation-wide)
expenditure share on barcode u ∈ Ujt with respect to the rest of the barcodes in that
category at time t.65
The resulting price indices have a mean close to that of the average prices paid and keep
significant dispersion – where the prices paid recorded in the data were considered outliers
(and trimmed) if they were below the bottom 10th percentile or above the 90th percentile.
Table 7 displays the summary statistics of both actual prices paid and the price indices for
some of the products in the data.
Table 7: Summary statistics of the price indices with respect to the average prices paid.









































653.06% of the prices paid by households are missing. I impute missing prices using a regression of the
national average price for a barcode on indicators (and interactions) of market, quarter, characteristics of the
barcode and income of the household as described in Section A.7.1 of the Appendix. The predicted prices
were then used to replace missing prices in the construction of price indices.
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Table 8: Average Standard Deviations within and across households.
Price Indices Unit Values
within across within across
Processed meat 1.189 1.774 2.602 2.882
Fresh meat and seafood 1.578 2.173 2.946 3.442
Unprocessed grains 1.617 2.501 3.014 3.663
Processed carbs 0.560 0.929 2.167 2.290
Sweetened beverages 0.196 0.303 0.737 0.846
Fresh produce 0.880 1.303 2.177 2.537
Dairy 0.788 1.151 2.362 2.527
Prepared/Frozen/Canned food 0.628 0.991 2.360 2.539
Sweeteners, Spreads and Jams 0.934 1.623 2.044 2.467
Butter/Margarine/Oils 1.145 1.921 2.128 2.611
A.8 Censoring
A.8.1 Details about the Positive sample
The Nielsen Homescan data is an unbalanced panel in which respondents’ mean duration is
on average 6 years (the minimum length of time they stay in the sample is 1 year and the
maximum 11 – which is the total length of the panel.) Most households – with the exception
of 51 out of a total of 121,900 – consume at least one of the products I consider for the
analysis in each period in which they belong to the sample.
I restrict the sample to that of household-half year period pairs (i, t) in which at least
one of the products I consider is consumed. The remaining 121,849 households in the data,
form 840,075 household-period pairs which I will refer to observations. Only 53% of these
observations correspond to a bundle of the J goods in which all of the expenditure shares
are positive. Let the set of observations with this property be the positive sample. Details
about the positive sample can be found in section (A.8.1) of the Appendix.
Households in the positive sample are observed for 2.5 years on average.
Table (9) summarizes the duration of panelists in the whole dataset and in the positive
subsample, the proportion of households who do not consume one of the products at any
point while they are in the sample, and the proportion of households who belong to the
positive sample at a point in time, but switch into a non-consumption regime.
Figure (27) plots the share of households who consume all the goods in each semester.
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Table 9: Average duration of panelists in the sample.
Nielsen Data Positive sample
Total number of households 121,849 61,154
Average duration of respondents 6 years 2.5 years
Proportion of households with a zero at some point 88.83% 39.02%
Figure 27: Proportion of households that consume
all the goods.
A.8.2 Other approaches to deal with Censoring
To deal with the significant presence of zero expenditure on some goods I use indirect infer-
ence ((Gourieroux et al., 1993)).
In a typical consumer optimization problem, some households may find it optimal, under
the prices they face, to consume negative amounts of a good. That is, if the non-negativity
constraints for the optimization problem were disregarded, their demands for some goods
would be negative. Lee and Pitt (1986) refer to these “demands” as notional demands. These
are not true demands but rather latent variables that correspond to the observed demands
via virtual prices, that is, the reservation prices that would induce a consumer to have zero
consumption of a good. A concept introduced by Neary and Roberts (1980) to characterize
household consumption behavior under quantity constraints.66
They use the individual’s Kuhn–Tucker conditions to construct the virtual prices that
would induce households to consume the exact ration levels of rationed goods had they been
66The paper is motivated by a context in which households are free to purchase in some markets but are
forced to purchase certain levels of goods in other markets – consumption restrictions during war time are a
good example of this setting.
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unrationed.
Lee and Pitt (1986) restrict their attention to the case where the rationing point is zero,
which greatly simplifies the virtual prices functions. Virtual prices in this setting are the
prices that would induce households to satisfy the non-negativity constraints of the cost
minimization problem – without imposing the non-negativity constraints.67 They compare
the virtual prices implied by corner solutions to the actual prices to derive the likelihood of
observing the households’ actual chosen bundle of goods.
The idea can be illustrated for the case of two goods. Suppose that the utility maximizing
bundle is a corner solution where x1 = 0 at market prices (p1, p2) as shown in Figure (28).
If the consumer’s optimization problem was solved without regard of the non-negativity
Figure 28: Figure taken from Phaneuf (1999).
constraint (x1, x2) ≥ 0, the solution would be given by the notional demands (q1, q2), where
q1 < 0.
The virtual price pi1 for good 1 is a reservation price for which consumption would be




, one can construct a tangency condition
67This is the dual of the approach developed by Wales and Woodland (1983), who constructed the like-
lihood function based on the Kuhn-Tucker conditions of maximization of a stochastic direct utility function
subject to budget and non-negativity constraints.
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for the observed consumption bundle that can be used to form an estimating equation. Since
market prices are below the virtual prices of non-consumed goods, the comparison among
these can be used to construct a likelihood function to estimate the parameters of the model
using all observed bundles.
These virtual prices are themselves functions of the household’s income and of the prices
of the uncensored goods. They can be calculated from the unconstrained demand and supply
functions as I illustrate in section A.8.3.
This approach becomes computationally infeasible as the number of censored goods
grows. Because of this, many studies using highly disaggregated data like the Nielsen Home-
scan Data, apply the Tobit estimator to estimate latent demand (see for example Zhen et al.
(2013)). This approach circumvents the empirical difficulties of imposing non-negativity re-
strictions under the framework outlined above. However, for the case of corner solutions in
demand system estimation, the application of Tobit estimation will, for systems with more
than two goods, result in biased estimates since they fail to consider that consumers response
to price depends on the set of goods it consumes at corners.
Furthermore, excluding from the sample those observations in which kink points are
observed is likely to result in sample selection bias (a widely used specification of preferences
with highly disaggregated data such as the Nielsen Data comes from the CES family68).
To deal with the significant presence of zero expenditure on some goods without resort-
ing to the computationally intensive approach developed by Lee and Pitt (1986), I use a
simulated method of moments estimator.
A.8.3 The use of virtual prices in my setting
In this case, the structural demand model consists of a system of equations given by (1)
which I repeat below for convenience.








ajk log(pikt) + ξi + εijt, j ∈ {1, . . . , J}.
Given a consumption regime, for example {wi1, . . . , wiJ}, where the first ` goods are
not consumed, we can solve for the virtual prices that support the zero demands for goods
1, . . . , ` by substituting zero for wi1, . . . , wi` in the demand system (1) and solving for the
reservation prices pii1, . . . , pii` that support this regime
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
given these virtual prices and a specification of the joint density fε for ε, we can define the
likelihood function for estimation.
There are 2J−1 possible consumption regimes for which the likelihood function for esti-
mation, which is formed by the product of the appropriate probabilities, can be constructed.
Maximum likelihood is used to recover estimates of the parameters. This is not an attrac-
tive option when J is large. For example, when J is 10, 2J−1 is 512, and high dimensional
integrals are involved for many of the combinations. For example, in cases where ` is 7, one
must evaluate a 7 dimensional integral. This is why I use a simulation based estimator.
A.8.4 Bias due to censoring
I find the bias due to censoring to be small under the fixed effect specification I use.69 To
simplify the following discussion, let me separate the goods into healthy and unhealthy and
define the positive sample as the set of (i, t) observations for which consumption of both
“goods” is positive.
Suppose we were to restrict the sample to that of households who consume positive
amounts of the healthy and unhealthy categories. Estimates of the structural parameters in
this sample would yield unbiased estimates if the selection into consuming positive amounts
was a deterministic function of the covariates70
If there was an unobserved factor that drives the decision of a household to consume
positive amounts of a good, and this unobserved factor was correlated with the random
component of the demand system, then these estimates would be biased.
69As can be seen in the discussion below, in a cross-sectional analysis, the bias due to censoring could be
sizable.
70Or, a function of the covariates with a random component that is uncorrelated with the random het-
erogeneity of the demand system.
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For example, let the distribution of the fixed effects ξij71 in the population be fixed
and suppose that a higher stock of preferences ξij increases the returns to consumption of
healthful products, so that ξij is positively correlated with the expenditure share on the
healthy category.
Suppose, additionally, that expenditure is correlated with positive consumption of health-
ful goods. Then upon an increase in the budget, the proportion of households who consume
zero of the healthful category would decrease. However, a larger proportion of households
who switch from zero consumption to positive consumption of healthful products would be
those with lower ξij (those with high ξij were consuming healthful products already). Then
the higher income households who consume a positive amount of the healthful category have,
on average, lower ξij than the population.
Consider restricting the sample to those households who consume a positive amount of
both the healthful and the unhealthful categories. On the one hand, the increase in income
will induce some households who had zero consumption of the healthy category to enter the
sample, lowering the average ξij of the sample with respect to the population level. On the
other hand, households with high ξij that were in the sample may shift all their consumption
towards the healthy category, and drop out of the sample, lowering further the average
human capital of the sample.
This selection process, thus, causes a negative correlation between income and ξij, causing
a downward bias in the coefficient on income in the demand equations.
This would be a serious concern in the cross-section because both income and prices
could be indeed correlated with positive consumption of food products in a non-trivial way
through ξij.
In the time series, however, this problem is attenuated. Recall, each demand equation of
the demand system reads
wijt = αj + βjyit +
J∑
k=1
ajk log(pikt) + ξij + εijt.
Let the selection rule that assigns individuals in the overall sample population to the re-
stricted sample be given by
dit = 1(zitγj + uijt).
71Let us think of ξij as a collection of traits such as knowledge or nutritional awareness possessed by the
members of the households.
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If f(ε1, . . . , εJ) = f1(ε1) · · · fJ(εJ), then,72 differencing the demand equations over time or
using the within transformation, would eliminate any potential selection problem which op-
erates through the fixed effect ξij. Indeed, a sufficient condition for identification taking
differences wijt−wijs for t 6= s and assuming that the unobserved disturbances are indepen-
dent is
E(εijt − εijs|Xijt, Xijs, dit = dis = 1) = 0.73(8)
Condition (8) puts no restrictions on how the selection mechanism or the regressors relate to
ξij. That is, as long as the selection process is uncorrelated with changes in the unobserved
disturbances and households who are selected in a time period, are also selected in the others,
the difference estimator will lead to unbiased estimates of the structural parameters.
The threat to identification comes from time-varying unobserved disturbances affecting
selection in and out of the sample. In the example above, this threat would materialize if
human capital changed over time in a way that would induce households to be selected into
the sample in some periods and selected out in others.74
A.9 Markov Chain Monte Carlo Simulation










where the weight matrix Ω is a diagonal matrix using the inverse variance of each moment
in the data.
Chernozhukov and Hong (2003) propose a Markov-Chain Monte-Carlo estimation pro-
cedure for this problem. MCMC is a derivative-free method that circumvents the curse of
dimensionality because it only requires evaluating the objective function at many different
points to simulate a chain of parameters that converges to a probability distribution over
72Estimating (1) in levels by pooled OLS (or in the cross-section using one time-period) would require
the following condition to be satisfied for the estimated parameters to be consistent.
E(ξij + εijt|Xijt, dit = 1) = 0.
73See Dustmann and Rochina-Barrachina (2007).
74Note that if households are selected at a given point in time t0 and stay in the sample continuously until
another point in time T0 and not observed in any other period in the selected sample, there would be no
threat to consistency of the estimates either (in the example above this would mean that changes in human













In practice, I use the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. One starts from a parameter guess
θ(k) and generates an alternative draw θ′ from a proposal density q(θ′|θ(k)) which I assume




θ′ with probability ρ(θ(k), θ′)
θ(k) with probability 1− ρ(θ(k), θ′)




under the assumption of uniform priors and the proposal
density a random walk.
A.10 Estimation Results
A.10.1 Real expenditure and Income
Nominal expenditures log(x) are increasing in income.
However, the Stone index deflated log nominal expenditures, log(x) − w log(p) are not
as can be seen in figure 30.
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Figure 29: Average log of expenditure on food by in-
come level.




Table 10 reports the estimates of the coefficient on the expenditure term – each parameter
estimate represents 0.01 times the change upon a 1% increase in expenditure.
The first column corresponds to the estimated parameters from the auxiliary model de-
fined on the positive sample; and the second column corresponds to the structural parameters
in model (3).
Table 10: Estimation Results: Income effects
Estimated Coefficients









































* Note: The reported standard errors of the coefficients of the whole sample
are based on 50 bootstrap replications of the estimation procedure.
The price effects captured by the parameters ajk are compensated budget price semielas-
ticities. That is, ajk captures the effect of a change in log-prices on expenditure shares, while
compensating the agent to keep him in the same indifference curve.
Table 11a and Table 11b report the estimated price effects from the auxiliary model
defined on the positive sample; and Table 12a and Table 12b the corresponding estimates of
the structural price effects on expenditure shares.
When so many cross-price elasticities are estimated with minimal functional form re-
strictions, some elasticities will not be easy to interpret. However, for the few that I have
a priori expectations, the estimated cross price elasticities align: in particular, one would
expect that fruit and vegetables and fresh meat and seafood are complements as they are
both typically used for preparing a meal. Similarly, dairy and sweeteners spreads and jams
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contain common ingredients that are consumed together (for example as a breakfast).
Table 11: Estimation Results
(a) Price effects from the positive sample: product categories 1 to 5
Product Number
1 2 3 4 5




































































































(b) Price effects from the positive sample: product categories 6 to 10
Product Number
6 7 8 9 10





































































































As discussed in Section 5, following Banks et al. (1997), I use log-income as an instrument
for expenditure. The validity of this instrument, lies in the assumption that households
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Table 12: Estimation Results
(a) Price effects from the whole sample: product categories 1 to 5
Product Number
1 2 3 4 5




































































































(b) Price effects from the whole sample: product categories 6 to 10
Product Number
6 7 8 9 10




































































































face variation in income over time, while the rest of their characteristics – in particular
their consumption environment, – remains unchanged. As a check of the validity of this
assumption, I use different subsamples (of the positive sample) to compare estimates of the
parameters.
Note that a raise in salary for one or both heads of the households while they both remain
in the same firm (and thus interact with the same network of people) and without changing
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home address would be the type income change that satisfies the exclusion restriction – as
long as the random component of preferences is uncorrelated with income.
I consider five subsamples of the positive sample. The first subsample I consider is that
of households from the positive sample before they change zipcodes. This slightly reduces
the number of periods I observe households – and reduces further the positive sample I can
use to estimate the model. In particular, 95.3% of the household-period observations remain
in the non-mover sample.75 The estimates are very similar to the ones I get in the whole
sample except for coefficients that are not significant: they remain non-significant, but these
coefficients do differ from the originals.
The second subsample I consider, is that of non-movers before the male head of the
household changes occupation – if at all.76 This, again, leaves the original sample of house-
holds intact but further reduces the household-period observations to 76.9% of the original
sample.77 The estimates are again similar to those from the original positive sample except
for the coefficients that were not statistically significantly different from zero.
The third, is that of non-movers before the male head and the female head change oc-
cupation. This leaves 68.26% of the household-period observations.78 The forth, is the sub-
sample of non-movers before the male head changes occupation and employment hours. This
leaves 75% of the household-period observations.79 and the fifth, adds the constraint that
the female head does not change occupation nor employment hours. This latter subsample
would be the cleanest subsample to make a comparison with the positive sample. However,
this subsample contails only 66% of the household-period observations, which significantly
reduces the variation that can be used for estimation.80
With the third, forth and fifth sub-samples, most of the coefficients become insignificant
and I find larger discrepancies. However, the conclusions from the estimates (which goods
are normal, which goods are inferior) remain the same except for the sweeteners, spreads
and jams category, which is statistically insignificant in the positive sample (and remains
statistically insignificant in all the sub-samples I consider.)
75In the positive sample, households are observed for an average of 4.3 periods, with a minimum of 2
periods and a maximum of 16. In the non-movers’ sample, the average number of periods decreases slightly
to 4.2 periods.
76If there is no male head, then I use the female head’s occupation and consider the household before the
female head changed occupation – if at all.
77The average number of periods I observe the households reduces to 3.5.
78The average number of periods households are observed in this sample is of 3.2.
79The average number of periods I observe households in this sample is 3.4.
80And an average number of periods of 3.4 again.
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Table 13: Estimated income effects from different subsamples of the positive sample.
Positive Subsample

























































































































* Note: Each column reports the estimated coefficients on log-deflated expenditure for a different
subsample. Subsample I refers to the subsample of non-movers. Subsample II refers to the sub-
sample of non-movers before the male head of the household changes occupation. Subsample III
refers to the subsample of non-movers before the male head and the female head change occupa-
tion. Subsample IV non-movers before the male head changes occupation or employment hours.
Subsample V non-movers before the either head changes occupation or employment hours.
A.10.4 Counterfactual Quantities Consumed
The difference between the predicted shares, E(wijt | Iit = I), and the counterfactual shares
under the price schedule of the top income group (pHk )Jk=1, E(wijt | I, pikt = pHk ), tell us
by how much households in income group I would adjust their expenditure shares in each
category if they all faced prices pH1 , pH2 , . . . , pHJ .








That is, the left-hand side of (10) captures the effect on i’s consumption of category j of
“changing” the price schedule from (pikt(I))Jk=1 to the average log-price schedule from the
top income group (pHikt)Jk=1.
I normalize the response in this shift in prices by converting the counterfactual shares
into the implied quantities fixing food expenditure at a hundred dollars for all households. I
plot the predicted quantities for each food category by income group in Figure 31.81




Figure 31: Price effects.
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A.11.2 Preferences
Figure 32: Preference effects.
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A.11.3 Income Effects







Economist, Mathematician, Scientist, Researcher Accountant, Auditor
Architect, Engineer, Pilot Artist, Entertainer, Writer, Dancer, Composer,
Athlete Business professional, non- managerial, Computer Programmer,
System Analyst, Data Processor Dentist, Doctor, Pharmacist, Physician’s
Assistant, Psychologist Educator, Lecturer, Librarian, Teacher, Coach,
Lawyer, Paralegal, Judge, Medical Technician, Paramedic, RN, Therapist,





Administrator, Company, Officer, Manager, Supervisor Banker, Controller,
Financial Analyst Builder, Contractor, Landscaper, Owner of Business,





Bank Teller, Bookkeeper, Cashier Clerk, Gas Attendant, Stock, Inventory
Computer, Graphic Design, Insurance Adjuster, Underwriter Mailroom,
Messenger, Postal Worker Receptionist, Secretary, Typist, Data Entry
4
Sales
Sales - Industrial, Wholesale





Foreman, Baker, Butcher, Seamstress, Tailor Carpenter, Electrician,
Painter, Plumber, Exterminator, Construction or Road Machine
Operator Mechanic, Repairman, Technician (except medical), Utility
Lineman, Serviceman, Building Inspector
6 Transportation Factory Machine Operator, Delivery, Route man, Driver-Bus, Taxi,Truck, Factory, Transportation Worker (Airline, Railroad, Cruise)
7 Military Member of Armed Forces
8
Service Occupations
Barber, Beautician, Nail Technician, Salon, Makeup Artist Bartender, Chef,
Food Service, Hotel Service, Child Care Worker, Housekeep, Maid, Dental
Assistant, Practical Nurse, Dental Hygienist, Fire fighter, Police Officer,
Sanitation, Security Officer Janitor, Porter
9 Agriculture Farmer (Manager, Owner, Worker)
10 Student Students Employed <30 hours
11 Operators, Fabrica-
tors, and Laborers
Construction worker, Shipping and Receiving Fisherman, Gardener,
Lumberman
12 Non-employment Housewife, Retired, Unable to work Unemployed, Laid off
The occupation groups are not named in the annual questionnaire given to the respondents. Households




A.11.6 Counterfactual Nutrient Consumption
A.12 Preference Parameters and Demographics
I find that income is positively correlated with preferences for healthy products (this is
consistent with the findings of Allcott et al. (2017) and Handbury (2013)). Two product
categories deviate from this general pattern: processed carbohydrates and fresh meat and
seafood. Specifically, preferences for processed meat, sweetened beverages, prepared, frozen
and canned food, sweeteners spreads and jams to be decreasing with income. Preferences
for oil, butter and margarine are slightly increasing with income for incomes under $40,000
and then decrease. Unprocessed grains and fruit and vegetables are increasing in income.
Preferences for dairy increase with income except at the very top. Processed carbs and fresh
meat and seafood are not monotonic with income – they are slightly concave and slightly
convex, respectively.82
82Preferences for processed carbs increase with income for incomes under $60,000 and then decrease
slightly. Symmetrically, preferences for fresh meat and seafood, decrease with income for incomes under
$60,000 and then increase. However, both of these preference parameters have little variation with income.
78
79
A.12.1 Preferences and Education
80
Table 14: Regression coefficients: preference parameters on education and income
(a) Estimates for food products 1-5


























































































































































Standard error in parentheses
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001
The regressions include zipcode-level income fixed effects.
81
(a) Estimates for food products 6-10


























































































































































Standard error in parentheses
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001
The regressions include zipcode-level income fixed effects.
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A.12.2 Preferences and Race
83
A.12.3 Preferences and Hours of Employment of the male head
84
A.12.4 Preferences and Hours of Employment of the female head
85
A.12.5 Preferences and Hours of Employment of both heads
86
